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NOTES
Priority Claims Under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act
Although it has been stated with regard to priorities in corporate reor-
ganizations 1 under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act 2 that "... the rules
of priority which obtain in equity are controlling and if the plan of reorganization
does not retain to each class of claims the priority or preference which it would
have been given in a court of equity, the plan fails to meet with the test of fair-
ness",3 this generalization appears to be invalid. However, it should be added
that the courts are not unlikely to adopt the same misconstruction of the Sec-
tion. Nevertheless it seems that an adequate discussion of this phase, at least,
of 77B necessitates something more than a restatement of the rules of equity
receiverships, prefaced by a brief notation that 77B was intended to effect no
change. It will be the purpose of this treatment to examine the changes which
do appear to have been intended, and to attempt to develop a hierarchy of
priorities, rather than to catalogue minutely the valid administration expenses
or the plethora of state insolvency preference statutes.
The Provisions of Section 77B
The provisions of the Section itself which are pertinent to a study of
priorities are subdivisions (b) (IO),4 (b) (3),5 (c) (3) 6 and (e)(1),7 and sub-
section (k).8 Although somewhat inartistically arranged and variously ex-
pressed, these provisions do appear to establish a complete, and not irrational
system of priorities.
Basic, and most comprehensive in scope, but unhappily the provision most
likely to be distorted, is the first, (b) (io). The most tenable construction of
I. This note will discuss only those priority problems which arise in connection with a
reorganization. If a reorganization is found inadvisable and an order of liquidation is en-
tered under § 77B (c) (8), the priorities provided for in § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act [30
STAT. 544, 563 (1898), amended, 44 STAT. 666 (I926), ii U. S. C. A. § 1O4 (Supp. 1936)]
will govern. § 77B (k) (5).
2. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), amended, 49 STAT. 664, 965 (1935), II U. S. C. A. § 207 (Supp.
1936).
3. 2 GFanEs, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936) § 639 (italics added).
4. "For all purposes of this section unsecured claims which would have been entitled to
priority over existing mortgages if a receiver in equity of the property of the debtor had
been appointed by a Federal court . . . shall be entitled to such priority...." (italics
added.)
5. Subdivision (b) (3) requires the plan to "... provide for the payment in cash of
all costs of administration and other allowances made by the court except that compensation
or reimbursement provided for in subdivision (c), clause (9) . . . may be paid in securi-
ties . . . if those entitled thereto will accept . . . and the court finds such compensa-
tion reasonable".
Subdivision (c) (9) provides that "... the judge . . . (9) may allow a reasonable
compensation for the services rendered and reimbursement for the actual and necessary ex-
penses incurred in connection with the proceeding and the plan by officers, parties in interest,
depositaries, reorganization managers and committees or other representatives of creditors
or stockholders, and the attorneys or agents of any of the foregoing and of the debtor. ..."
6. Subdivision (c) (3) authorizes the issue of trustee's certificates ". . . for such law-
ful purposes . . . and with such security and such priority in payments over existing
obligations, secured or unsecured, as may be lawful in the particular case".
7. As amended, 49 STAT. 965 (1935). "If . . . the United States is a creditor on claims
for taxes or customs duties . . . no plan which does not provide for the payment thereof
shall be confirmed by the judge except upon the acceptance of a lesser amount by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury. ..
8. See supra note I.
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which this subdivision is susceptible would allow priority in 77B reorganizations
to all unsecured claims which would have been prior to mortgages in an equity
receivership,9 and to no other unsecured claims. But this reading eliminates an
important and well recognized body of equity priorities, namely, those unse-
cured 10 claims which were preferred over other unsecured creditors, but not
over mortgagees and lienors.1" And therefore the constant resort to equity
analogies in the application of 77B 12 may result in a gradual extension of the
plain import of (b) (io), to prevent so drastic a modification of receivership
principles. However, this approach, while appropriate with regard to many
other provisions of the Section, is undesirable here. In the first place, (b) (io)
is unambiguous, and needs no "clarification". Nor will it do to say that Con-
gress intended the clause to be merely illustrative rather than all inclusive, or
that these priorities were required, while the fate of the other equity priorities
was consigned to the discretion of the 77B court. 3 The amended Section 77,
governing railroad reorganizations, expressly grants priority in subdivision (b)
to all unsecured claims which would have been entitled to equity priority, 4 and
9. See, e. g., Reynolds v. Black, 91 Iowa 1, 58 N. V. 922 (1894) ; St. Paul Title Ins. &
Trust Co. v. Diagonal Coal Co., 95 Iowa 551, 64 N. W. 6o6 (1895) ; Sitton v. DuBois, 14
Wash. 624, 45 Pac. 3o3 (1896). Included also, in addition to these cases, which concerned
state priority statutes, are six months claims to the limited extent that they will be applicable
in the reorganization of industrial corporations and public utilities, q. v. infra p. 821. Friendly,
Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganization Act (1934) 48 HAV. L. REV. 39, 59-60,
adopts a similar view. Friendly, however, would apparently have (b) (IO) govern liens as
well as unsecured claims, which would curtail the recognition of many statutory liens, all of
which appear to be dealt with and upheld by (k), infra p. 817. Also he does not distinguish
between unsecured priority claims which are preferred only to subsequent mortgages and
those which are preferred to antecedent mortgages as well.
Properly construed, (b) (io) should grant priority only to those unsecured claims
which equity would prefer to antecedent mortgages, for otherwise the word "existing" is
tautological, requiring merely that the mortgages in the equity receivership exist in the
equity receivership. But this distinction, while material with regard to liens, seems never to
have been drawn with regard to non-lien priority claims, and the broader construction is
followed in this note. Unsecured claims, if preferred at all over a mortgage, are usually prior
to every mortgage, regardless of when it was created.
A restricted interpretation might confine such priorities only to those 77B proceedings
in which a mortgage actually does exist. However, this limitation is unwarranted, since
there no apparent reason why the claimant, in order to be preferred, should have to be fol-
lowed by a mortgage in addition to unsecured claims, if he would prevail over both, were
both present. The purely fortuitous existence of a mortgage in the particular case should
not affect the relationship among the other groups of creditors. Furthermore, the restriction
would seldom be material, for it is hardly likely that many unmortgaged corporations will
find themselves in a reorganization court.
Finally, there seems to be no reason to treat other liens differently from mortgage liens,
although the Section refers only to the latter. A priority claimant who prevails over or is
subordinate to one fares similarly with regard to the other. See the use of the comprehen-
sive terms "lien" and "lienholder" in I CLARK, RECEIVERS (2d ed. 1929) § 668; 16 FLETCHER,
CORPORATIONS (Penn. ed. 1933) § 7952.
io. Secured claims are expressly entitled to their priority status, whatever it may have
been under state law, in a 77B proceeding. See infra pp. 817, 825.
ii. See, e. g., Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co. of N. Y., 1 Pet. 386 (U. S. 1828) (federal tax
claim); Marshall v. New York, 254 U. S. 38o (1920) (state tax claim) ; Schmidtman v.
Atlantic Phosphate & Oil Corp., 23o Fed. 769 (C. C. A. 2d, I916) (wage claim).
12. Duparquet Huot Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U. S. 216 (936), 84 U. OF PA. L.
RxV. 782. See Sabel, The Corporate Reorganizations Act (934) 19 MINN. L. REV. 34, 36.
13. A similar argument was employed in In re Central Public Serv. Corp., C. H. Bankr.
Serv. 113723 (D. Md. 1935), to grant a priority over other unsecured claimants. The court
held that subdivision (k) removed the obligation from the bankruptcy court to grant the
priorities of § 64, leaving to the discretion of the court under 77B (a) the allowance of priori-
ties. For a criticism of this view, see Developments in the Law-Reorganization under Sec-
tion 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 1111, 1177-1178.
14. 49 STAT. 911, 913, II U. S. C. A. § 205 (b) (Supp. 1936).
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not merely to those that equity preferred to mortgagees. 15 Not only should some
effect be given to this difference in phraseology, but a comparison of Section 77
with 77B affords some evidence that the draftsmen were capable of differentiating
and of expressing their intent. 16  Furthermore, when in 1935, Congress was
apprehensive lest government claims be denied priority 7 as many of them would
have been under the reading set out above,18 taxes and customs duties were
dearly preferred by an amendment.' 9  But priority was not extended to any
other claims, similarly barred, and Senator Burke stated that this was the intent
of Congress.
20
Thus, (b)(io) does not compel the recognition of the priority status of
claims preferred merely over unsecured obligations. And neither (b) (io) nor
any other provision of 77B permits such action. It is fundamental that priorities
not expressly incorporated into the Bankruptcy Act are inapplicable in bank-
ruptcy proceedings,"- and 77B is part of the Bankruptcy Act, so that reorganiza-
tion proceedings are now bankruptcy proceedings.2 2 Also, it should be remem-
I5. The original § 77 did restrict priorities, in the same language employed by 77B. 47
STAT. 1474, 1477 (1933), I1 U. S. C. A. §205n. (c) (Supp. 1936). The force of the phrase
"over existing mortgages" in the original § 77 (c) has been recognized. See Rodgers and
Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act
(1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 571, 599.
16. Of course, there is the equally valid argument that the amendment of § 77 after so
brief a time demonstrates that Congress desired to incorporate the entire equity priority sys-
tem into the reorganization section, and thought that it had done so by the original § 77.
17. 79 CONG. REc. 14101, 14658 (1935). There appear to be no reported decisions deny-
ing federal priority under 77B, although the Congressional discussion indicated that there had
been such action by the courts.
I8. Debts, other than taxes or customs dues, owing to the United States and preferred
by REv. STAT. § 3466, 31 U. S. C. A. § 391 (1927), have priority over unsecured creditors
only. Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co. of N. Y., i Pet. 386 (U. S. 1828) ; United States v. Guar-
anty Trust Co. of N. Y., 33 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929), aff'd, 280 U. S. 478 (1930).
Compare Thelusson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396 (U. S. 1817) with Brent v. Bank of Washington,
1o Pet. 596 (U. S. 1836). Tax claims now have a lien status, first conferred by 14 STAT. 107
(1866), REv. STAT. § 3186, 26 U. S. C. A. §§ I56O-1562 (I935). See infra p. 817, Blair, The
Priority of the United States in Equity Receiverships (1925) 39 HAv. L. REV. i.
19. 49 STAT. 965 (1935), II U. S. C. A. §207 (e) (i) (Supp. 1936).
20. 79 CONG. REC. 14101 (1935).
21. Missouri v. Ross, 8o F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935), af'd, 299 U. S. 72 (1936);
Guarantee Title & Tr. Co. v. Title Guaranty & Sur. Co., 224 U. S. 152 (1912); Davis v.
Pringle, 268 U. S. 315, 317 (1925) ("It may be assumed that the priority must be found if at
all in the Bankruptcy Act . . ."). See In re Island Dredging Corp., 61 F. (2d) 765, 767
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; SLxpenny Say. Bk. v. Estate of Stuyvesant Bk., 22 Fed. Cas. No. 12919
(S. D. N. Y. 1874), at 269; 2 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (3th ed. 1923) 1474 (". . . the
bankrupt (sic) act not only controls the State law . . . but by its express regulation of
these priorities excludes the State law altogether.") ; Friendly, supra note 9, at 61.
The provision of the Judicial Code requiring federal receivers and managers appointed
by federal courts to operate the receivership property according to the valid laws of the
state wherein it is situated [36 STAT. 1104 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 124 (1927)] would not
seem to vary this principle. In the first place, granting priorities is not the operation of
property. Secondly, priority laws of the states may be considered as not "valid laws" in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. This provision is obviously designed to cover such things as safety regu-
lations, workmen's compensation, etc.
REV. STAT. §§ 917 and 918, authorizing the federal courts to prescribe their own pro-
cedure and practice [28 U. S. C. A. §§ 730, 731 (1927)] are likewise inapplicable here. Al-
though matters of priority are for the forum, they are so substantial as not to come within
a grant of power over procedure. The minuteness with which Congress has hitherto regu-
lated priorities would seem to substantiate this. See infra p. 820, discussing this question in
the equity courts.
22. See Continental Ill. Nat. Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S. 648,
672 (1935) ; Kaplan, Is Section 77B a Proper Part of a Bankruptcy Act? (1935) 21 A. B.
A. J. 47; Silbiger, Is Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act a Law on the Subject of Bank-
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bered that even as restricted here, 77B contains a rather extensive system of
priorities, so that there is no necessity to include others "forgotten" by the legis-
lators.
It has been argued, too, that subsection (k) completely disenabled the court
to grant such additional priorities on the ground that Section 64, while not a
serious obstacle in a liquidation, might encourage creditors whose chances of
obtaining a priority were speculative to obstruct an expeditious reorganization.
23
This viewpoint is strengthened by the similarity between the claims preferred
by Section 64 and those enjoying priority in equity, although the order of
priority was different .2  Therefore, it may well be that by excluding Section
64, which preferred wage claims, 25 non-lien tax claims, 26 and "debts owing to
any person who by the laws of the States or of the United States is entitled to
priority",2 7 only to unsecured creditors, 28 Congress desired to eliminate the
priority accorded to substantially the same group of creditors in equity.
29
It would seem unsound to attach any material importance in the case of
substantive rights to that vague half sentence obscurely placed in the depths of
a subsection devoted wholly to procedure, subsection (a), and which vests in
the reorganization court ". . . all the powers, not inconsistent with this sec-
tion, which a Federal court would have, had it appointed a receiver in
equity . .".0°
Finally, Section 77B, while largely devoted to remedying the defects and
abuses adhering to the procedure of the equity receivership,31 was also intended
"for the relief of debtors".3 2 Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect that the
equity rules, which emphasized the rights of the creditors," should be modified
somewhat by regarding less highly the various interests of the creditors in order
to facilitate a rehabilitation in which all may join and benefit the majority. The
curtailment of the rights of lien-holders by 77B, 84 for the first time in bank-
ruptcies Within the Meaning of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution? (1935) I CoRP.
REORG. 300; Gerdes, Constitutionality of Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1934) 12
N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 196.
23. Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1178.
24. See, e. g., Rogge, The Differences in the Priority of the United States in Bankruptcy
and in Equity Receiverships (1929) 43 H.Av. L. REv. 251.
25. § 64 (b) (5), II U. S. C. A. § 104 (b) (5) (Supp. 1936).
26. § 64 (b) (6), id. at (b) (6).
27. § 64 (b) (7), id. at (b) (7).
28. In re Brannon, 62 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933), cert. denied sub noin., Ryan v.
Dallas, 289 U. S. 742 (933) ; Dunn v. Interstate Bond Co., 68 F. (2d) 364 (C. C. A. 5th,
1934), cert. denied, 292 U. S. 645 (934) ; Odendahl v. Pokorny Realty Co., 76 F. (2d) 271
(C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
29. For a convenient illustration of the similarity, compare the text to which notes 25,
26, 27 are appended with Fordham, Preferences of Prereceivership Claims in Equity Re-
ceiverships (1931) 15 MixNr. L. REV. 261, 285 and 2 GEDEs, op. cit. supra note 3, § 660.
30. § 77B, nU . S. C. A. § 207 (a). To confer equity powers on the 77B court does not
mean that the court is to adopt in toto all the equity rules. "Power" is more nearly akin to
"jurisdiction" than to the body of decisional precepts. In other words, the reorganization
court has the power to grant priorities, as did the equity and bankruptcy courts, but the
Section restricts the exercise of the power to certain instances, and these rules may differ
from the equity rules as they differ from the bankruptcy law. Cf. note 21 supra, on the
Judicial Code provisions.
3. See Duparquet Huot & Moneuse v. Evans, 297 U. S. 216, 219 (0936), 84 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 782; In re Greyling Realty Corp., 74 F. (2d) 734, 736 (C. C. A. 2d, I935).
32. Bankruptcy Act, § 77A, 48 STAT. 912, I1 U. S. C. A. § 2o6 (Supp. 1936) ; Campbell
v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947, 950 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 581
(1935) ; In re Philadelphia Rap. Tr. Co., 8 F. Supp. 51, 54 (E. D. Pa. 1934), aff'd sub norn.,
Wilson v. Philadelphia Rap. Tr. Co., 73 F. (2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
33. But see Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 217-218 (1872).
34. § 77B (b). See In re Tennessee Pub. Co., 8I F. (2d) 463 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936), 84
U. OF PA. L. REv. 782, aff'd sub nom., Tennessee Pub. Co. v. American Nat. Bk., 299 U. S.
i8 (1936).
NOTES
ruptcy legislation, affords additional illustration of a lessening of the protection
thrown about hitherto preferred groups.
The primary significance of subsection (k), which eliminates the priorities
of Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act from 77B reorganization proceedings, lies
in its adoption of all other provisions of the Act except those inconsistent with
the provisions of 77B," 5 "whether or not an order to liquidate the estate has
been entered". This would seem to incorporate into 77B, Sections 67 (d) 81
and 7o (a),37 preserving valid liens.
Claims Accorded Priority 88
Federal Governmental Claims. Obligations owing to the Federal Govern-
ment receive priority by the amended subdivision (e) (i) and subsection (k),
the latter of which preserves tax liens attaching by virtue of Revised Statutes,
Section 3186.89 The result is that federal claims for taxes and customs duties
will be preferred, but the United States should share pro rata with other un-
secured creditors in so far as its other claims are concerned, the purpose of
(e) (i), in dealing with federal claims in general, being merely to authorize the
Secretary of the Treasury to act on behalf of the United States, which shall be
deemed to be affected by any plan submitted whenever it is a creditor. 0  How-
ever a distinction is drawn with regard to taxes and customs dues, for no plan
may be approved which does not provide for their payment 41 in full,42 with the
proviso that the Secretary may accept less, with his consent being conclusively
presumed if he fails to accept or reject the plan within ninety days.
In equity receiverships, Sections 3466 43 and 3186 44 of the Revised Statutes
were the bases of federal priority. Much of the effect of Section 3186 has been
incorporated into (e) (i), but Section 3466, which granted priority to all debts
owing to the Federal Government, but only over unsecured creditors, 45 and
35. There are certain other exceptions not material here, such as provisions in the Bank-
ruptcy Act for the appointment of a referee, payment of dividends, etc., which also apply
only when an order for liquidation has been entered. See supra note 1.
36. 36 STAT. 842 (I9io), ii U. S. C. A. § 107 (d) (1927). "Liens given or accepted in
good faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud upon the provisions of this title, and for
a present consideration, which have been recorded according to law, if record thereof was
necessary in order to impart notice, shall, to the extent of such present consideration only,
not be affected by anything herein (i. e., the Bankruptcy Act)".
37. 30 STAT. 544, 565 (1898), II U. S. C. A. § IIo (a) (1927). "The trustee . . .
shall . . . be vested . . . with the title of the bankrupt. .. ."
38. This portion of the discussion will be devoted to a determination of what claims
have any priority, regardless of the rank The next section, infra pp. 823 et seq., will deal
with the order of the priority claims.
39. 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 156o-1562 (1935).
40. But see Develop ifents in the Law, supra note 13, at 1179, which apparently interprets
(e) (I) to grant priority to all federal claims.
41. It is not stated clearly in 77B whether by "payment" is meant payment in cash or in
securities. Subdivision (b) (i), requiring the payment of administration expenses, does
stipulate for cash in some circumstances while permitting securities as payment for other
expenses. The failure to mention cash in (e) (i) may be construed as allowing the option
of cash or securities. On the other hand, it seems doubtful whether the United States is
expected to become a security holder in a multitude of reorganized corporations of every
description. But compare the R. F. C. Act and its amendments which expressly contemplate
such a course, at least with regard to insurance companies and banks. 47 STAT. 5 (1932),
amended, 48 STAT. 119 (1933), 48 STAT. i11 (1934), 49 STAT. 3, 4 (935); 15 U. S. C. A.
§§ 6ose-g, 6o6a-i (Supp. 1936).
42. The Section is not explicit on this point, but such would seem to be its plain intent.
43. 31 U. S. C. A. § 191 (1927).
44. 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 1560-1562 (1935).
45. United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73 (U. S. 1805) ; Brent v. Bank of Washington,
io Pet. 569 (U. S. 1836).
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perhaps "general lienors",46 has fared less favorably. Such priorities should be
non-existent in 77B proceedings. As we have seen, if the merest inference be
valid, subdivision (b) (i) would exclude them, and the expression of Congres-
sional intent to prefer only taxes and customs duties by (e) (I) is indisputable.
47
Therefore, with Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act inapplicable under 77B (k),
and with Section 3466 not made part of the reorganization law by any other
provision, there can be no federal priority in the absence of a lien, since it has
become well nigh axiomatic by now that the United States Government is to be
preferred only to the extent that Congress, by statute, specifically requires such
treatment.48 There is no general common law prerogative giving the Federal
Government a preference, as there is in many state governments.
49
Federal taxes imposed during the period of administration will likewise
receive priority, since the wording of (e) (i) is broad enough to include them
as well as pre-receivership taxes. In addition, they are necessary administration
expenses,50 and should be preferred on that ground under subdivisions (b) (3)
and (c) (3).
Claims Preferred by State Insolvency and Lien Laws. Debts owed to the
states themselves or to their local government units, and private claims entitled
to preferential treatment because of state law are governed by the same provi-
sions of 77B, subdivision (b) (io) and subsection (k).
Those state tax claims which are given the status of liens by state law will
receive priority under (k), which adopts Section 67 (d) of the Act, and thus
preserves liens. Although there was some effort recently in a district court
case,5 later reversed,52 to confine the effect of 67 (d) to voluntarily contracted
liens, that Section has been repeatedly held applicable to all liens, whether
"statutory",-3 such as mechanics' liens, tax liens, etc., or contractual. The
validity of liens is generally determined by the law of the state in which the
property is situated at the time the lien is sought to be created.54 Thus to the
extent that the property of the debtor corporation is present within the claim-
ant state, that state may subject it to a lien for the payment of taxes or other
obligations, and the 77B court must recognize the priority thereby acquired.
46. Thelusson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396 (U. S. 1817). But cf. Conard v. Atlantic Fire
Ins. Co. of N. Y., i Pet. 386 (U. S. 1828).
47. 79 CoNG. REc. 14101, 14658 (1935).
48. Brent v. Bank of Washington, io Pet. 596 (U. S. 1836); Davis v. Pringle, 268
U. S. 315 (1925) ; see United States v. State Bank of N. C., 6 Pet. 29, 35 (U. S. 1832).
See supra note 21.
49. Marshall v. New York, 254 U. S. 380 (I92O), and cases cited therein, at 383.
5o. Wire Wheel Corp. of America v. Fayette Bk. & Tr. Co., 3o F. (2d) 318 (C. C. A.
7th, 1928), cert. denied, 279 U. S. 873, 877 (1929).
Si. In re Brannon, 53 F. (2d) 401 (N. D. Tex. ig3i).
52. In re Brannon, 62 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 5th, I933), cert. denied sub norn., Ryan v.
Dallas, 289 U. S. 742 (1933).
53. Ibid; Henderson v. Mayer, 225 U. S. 631 (1912) ; Richmond v. Bird, 249 U. S. 174
(1919) ; Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318 (93).
54. Swank v. Hufnagle, i Ind. 453, 12 N. E. 303 (1887); Campbell v. Coon, 149
N. Y. 556, 44 N. E. 300 (1896); RESTATIxENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (0934) §§ 223, 225, 230
(land) ; Youssoupoff v. Widener, 246 N. Y. 174, 158 N. E. 65 (1927) ; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1935) § 279.1; RESTATEmENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 279 (chattels). When a right
or a chattel is "embodied in a document", the law of the place where the document is
situated governs the creation of interests in it. Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E.
65 (1933); 2 BF.ALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §262.1; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 262, 349. When the property is a chose in action, the law of the place where the debtor
is would seem to control the creation of interests in the property without the consent of the
owner-creditor, whereas in the case of a voluntary transfer, the place of transfer governs.
See RESTATEmENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS §§ IO8, 350-352.
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In addition to state lien claims, the 77B court should award priority to such
unsecured claims of the state as were, again by local law,55 preferred in in-
solvency to existing mortgages, and to such unsecured tax claims only. This
eliminates the priority formerly enjoyed in equity by non-lien local tax claims
having precedence over other unsecured creditors, but not over mortgagees.56
That Congress has the constitutional power to affect the rights of the states in
the estate of a bankrupt has been confirmed by the United States Supreme
Court, both where the United States was the adverse claimant 57 and where
individuals were alone benefited,5 s although the receivership courts, unhampered
by a definitive statute, have displayed considerable liberality toward the states.
However, the few decisions on this point have followed the equity rules.5 9
The courts ignored completely (b) (io), concerning themselves chiefly with the
application of subsections (a) and (k). They were moved secondarily by an
unnecessary respect for the sovereign prerogative of the state as a tax gatherer.
The decisions were based on the contention that (k) did not absolutely forbid
all priorities, but merely rendered those particular ones no longer obligatory.
Then, with the support of (a), which permits the exercise of all the powers of a
federal receivership court, priority was granted to state claims which were en-
titled to preference over unsecured creditors only. But, while 77B (k) does not
expressly forbid the equity priorities, it certainly furnishes no basis for their
application. Furthermore, such extreme emphasis upon subsection (a) as a
source of substantive power seems unwarranted. ,t
Valid state taxes accruing subsequent to the approval of the petition are in
a better position, rightfully, than pre-receivership state claims. They should be
treated, as in equity,60 like any, other administrative expense and should be
accorded the priority attached thereto under (b) (3) and (c) (3) .
The same principles should govern private claims preferred by state law.Thus wages,62 workmen's compensation claims, 63 rent,64 priorities of residents
55. The equity courts followed the law of the taxing state in determining the priority oftax claims. Marshall v. New York, 254 U. S. 380 (1920).
56. E. g., that in Marshall v. New York, 254 U. S. 380 (192o), cited supra note 55.See also County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U. S. 8o (1929).57. This would seem to be obvious under the doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4Wheat. 316 (U. S. i81g) and Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869). County ofSpokane v. United States, 279 U. S. 8o (1929) ; Stover v. Scotch Hills Coal Co., 4 F. (2d)
748 (W. D. Pa. 1924).
58. New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U. S. 329 (1933).59. In re Central Public Service Corp., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 113723 (D. Md. 1935).See also, In re Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co., W. D. N. Y., Dec. 19, 1935, discussed in
Developments in the Law, spra note 13, at 1177.
6o. McGregor v. Johnson, 39 F. (2d) 574 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); Hardee v. AmericanSec. & Tr. Co., 77 F. (2d) 382 (App. D. C. 1935); Piedmont Corp. v. Gainesville & N. W.R R., 30 F. (2d) 525 (N. D. Ga. 192g); Central Trust Co. v. New York C. & N. R. R.,iO N. Y. 250, 18 N. E. 92 (1888) ; Gehr v. Iron Co., 174 Pa. 430, 34 Atl. 638 (1896). 48STAT. 993 (934), 28 U. S. C. A. § 124 (a) (Supp. 1936) expressly subjects federal re-ceivers and trustees to the payment of state taxes ordinarily applicable to the business theyare managing. See also, 36 STAT. 1104 (19II); 28 U. S. C. A. § 124 (I927).
61. It re Preble Corporation, I5 F. Supp. 775 (S. D. Me. 1936).62. Schmidtman v. Atlantic Phosphate & Oil Corp., 230 Fed. 769 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916);Fitzgerald v. Maxim Powder 1M4fg. Co., 33 At. io64 (N. J. Eq. I896) ; Kauper, InsolvencyStatutes Preferring Wages Due Employees (0932) 30 MICH. L. REV. 504; Note (1932) 30MIcH. L. REv. 942; PA. STAT. AN,. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 43, §221; N. Y. CoNsoiL LAws
(Cahill, 1930) c. 24, § 18o.63. Bowen v. Hockley, 7I F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), 34 COL L. REy. 1558, 19MixN. L. Rnv. 253; PA. STAT. AwN. (Purdon, 1931) Vit. 77, §621; N. Y. Co9sor LAws
(Cahill, 1930) c. 66, § 34. Statutes also grant priority to the claims of compensation insurersagainst the insured insolvent employer for premiums. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp.1936) tit. 40, § 812; N. Y. Co sOL. LAWS (Cahill, Saupp. 1935) c. 66, § 130.
64. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 39, § 96.
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over foreign corporations 65 and any other claims which were prior by state law,
and therefore in the equity court received a preference, will retain their favored
position only if they satisfy the exacting requirements of 77B that they be a
lien, or an unsecured claim which is prior to mortgages.
66
Priorities,6 7 like exemptions, 68 are usually considered to be governed by the
forum, and one would especially expect this to be so where the procedure in the
forum has developed out of the execution process.
6 9 Furthermore, the principles
of the equity receivership should certainly be, if anything is, a matter of general
commercial concern within the spirit of the rule of Swift v. Tyson.
70  Thus the
conclusion is inescapable that the federal equity courts should never have applied
the state priority statutes, but should have contented themselves with a recog-
nition of appropriate federal statutes like Revised Statutes, Section 3466 71 and
a development of their own rules where necessary, as in the case of "six months"
claims. 72  However, the obviously substantial nature of the priority claimant's
right has led the federal courts to consider it as something in the nature of a
lien or "quasi-lien", which, following the usual conflict of laws rules, should be
governed by the state of creation. But even while erroneously adopting the
65. In re Boggs-Rice Co., 66 F. (2d) 855 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933), 34 CoL L. REv. 553, 12
TENN. L. REv. 131; TENN. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 4134. This priority is unconstitu-
tional as against a natural person who is a non-resident. Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239
(1898) ; cf. Blake v. McClung, 176 U. S. 59 (1899).
66. Of course, the reorganization court, like the receivership court must decide whether
the state statute is really an insolvency statute, whether it was intended to apply only to state
proceedings, and must ascertain from it the extent of the claims and the particular kinds of
beneficiaries and corporations to which its attention is directed. See In re Northumberland
Mining Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 3444 (N. D. Pa. 1935); McDaniel v. Osborne, 72 N. H.
6oi (Ind. App. 19o4); Fordham, op. cit. supra note 29, at 287; Kauper, loc. cit. mtpra
note 62.
The distinction between a lien and a priority of an unsecured debt has thus become
extremely important, although under the equity receivership rules it was not to be ignored,
since upon it depended the rank of the various priority claimants in many instances. See,
e. g., County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U. S. 8o (1929) ; Schmidtman v. Atlantic
Phosphate & Oil Corp., 23o Fed. 769 (C. C. A. 2d, I916), and cases cited therein.
The description of it in the state statute as a lien should be of some weight. Likewise,
and perhaps more conclusive, is the priority given to it in the state against subsequent en-
cumbrances and attempted conveyances of the property. Cf. Schmidtman v. Atlantic Phos-
phate & Oil Co., 23o Fed. 769 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916) ; Seymour v. Berg, 227 Ill. 411, 81 N. E.
339 (igo7) ; McDaniel v. Osborn, 166 Ind. I, 75 N. E. 647 (1905) ; Sitton v. DuBois, 14
Wash. 624, 45 Pac. 303 (1896). Many states term the preference a "lien", but say that it
attaches only when the property passes into the hands of the receiver, so that it attaches
only to the unliened assets, as that is all that the receiver takes. Clough v. Superior Equip-
ment Co., 18 Del. Ch. 65, 202, 156 AtI. 249 (13i); see the discussion in Fitzgerald v.
Maxim Powder Mfg. Co., 33 Atl. lO64 (N. J. Eq. 1896). Such a "lien" would seem to
have none of the attributes normally adhering to liens, and should be treated for the pur-
poses of 77B as a priority claim only, with the result that it should not be recognized, for it
is not prior to existing mortgages. In general, there must be something resembling an inter-
est in property, something "carved out" of it and transferred to the creditor as security,
whether done voluntarily, as by a mortgage, or involuntarily as in the case of tax or
mechanics' liens.
67. The Colorado [1923] P. 1O2 (C. A.) ; The Zigurds [1932] P. 113; 3 BEALE, CoN-
FLI cT OF LAws (1935) § 6oo.i.
68. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710 (1899); Morgan v. Neville, 74 Pa.
52 (1873) ; RESTATEMENT, CoNFmIcr OF LAws (1934) § 600. Contra: Drake v. Lake Shore
& M. S. Ry., 69 Mich. 168 (1888).
69. See i CLARK, REcERs (2d ed. 1929) cc. II, V, VI.
70. 16 Pet. i (U. S. 1842). That is, while the hiolding of the case does not govern
this situation, the desire manifested in it for a uniform commercial law should have en-
couraged the federal equity courts to formulate a federal law of priorities in receiverships,
rather than permit so important a subject to be governed by the diverse and often provin-
cially capricious views of the state legislatures, such as that discussed in supra note 65.
71. 31 U. S. C. A. § 191 (1927).
72. See infra p. 821.
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state priority rules as a matter of convenience, several of the federal courts have
realized that the local law placed no constraint upon them,73 although Mr. Justice
Brandeis appears to think otherwise.7 4  However, right or wrong, the practice
has grown up, and while it probably should be discarded to decrease the number
of priorities, it is likely to remain. And especially is it likely to remain in 77B
proceedings, with (b) (IO) "codifying" at least a portion of the previous error.
The 77B court will probably, and should confine itself, as did the equity court,
to a recognition of state priorities only to the extent that property exists in that
state, for the state law should be given no greater effect here than it is given in
the case of a lien,7 5 where it is properly held to be controlling.
Six Months Claims. Pre-receivership claims, principally for wages and
supplies, accruing immediately before the petition, and conveniently denominated
as "six months" claims, while of consequence as priority claims in railroad re-
organizations under Section 77,7 should have little pertinency in 77B proceed-
ings. The currently strong position of the major portion of the public utility
industry other than railroads will confine the operation of 77B largely to private
corporations, and regardless of the real reasons underlying the "six months"
rule,77 these corporations have been held by equity courts to be unaffected by it. 7s
Therefore, as such claims were only on a parity with unsecured obligations of
commercial corporations in equity, they are not within the priority system of
77B. 0
In the reorganization of those less affluent public service corporations ren-
dering traction, gas and water service which will wend their way into 77B, the"six months rule" would appear to apply, with the customary priority in income 8 0
or corpus.8' While the cases before the Supreme Court have been concerned
exclusively with railroad receiverships 2 and there has been some hesitancy
among lower federal courts in extending the rule to other utilities,83 the general
73. Dickinson v. Saunders, 129 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. Ist, 19o4) ; Crampton v. Lautz Bros.
& Co., 274 Fed. 743 (W. D. N. Y. I921); Mastin & Co. v. Pickering Lumber Co., 2 F.
Supp. 6o5 (N. D. Cal. 1933). Cf. Stanley Works v. Garland Typewriter Mfg. Co., 278
Fed. 995 (E. D. N. Y. 1922).
74. Marshall v. New York, 254 U. S. 380 (1920).
75. See supra note 54.
76. §77 (b), ii U. S. C. A. §205 (b) (Supp. 1936), 49 STAT. 911, 913 (1935).
77. See Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235 (1878) ; Southern Ry. v. Carnegie Steel Co.,
176 U. S. 257 (19oo); Turner v. Indianapolis, B. & W. Ry., 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,258 (C. C.
D. Il. 1878); Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 216 Fed. 458 (C. C. A. 2d,
1914) ; La Hote v. Boyet, 85 Miss. 636, 38 So. I (19o4) ; FitzGibbon, Present Status of the
Six Months' Rule (934) 34 Co. L. REV. 230; Wham, Preference in Railroad Receiverships
(1928) 23 ILL. L. RE:. 14W; Hirth, Priority of Claims in Public Utility Receiverships
(1929) 27 MIcH. L. REV. 241.
78. Spencer v. Taylor Creek Ditch Co., 194 Fed. 635 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912) ; De Vries v.
Alsen Cement Co., 290 Fed. 746 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Cowan v. Pennsylvania Plate Glass
Co., 184 Pa. I, 38 Atl. 1075 (1898). Occasionally, lower federal courts or state courts have
allowed such priorities in private corporation receiverships. Olyphant v. St. Louis Ore &
Steel Co., 22 Fed. 179 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1884); LeHote v. Boyet, 85 Miss. 636, 30 So. I
(1904).
79. In re James Butler Grocery Co., io F. Supp. 8o9 (E. D. N. Y. 1935); see Mpra
pp. 814-817.
So. Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235 (1878) (pre-receivership income); Virginia &
Ala. Coal Co. v. Central IR R. of Ga., 170 U. S. 355 (,898) (receivership income).
Si. Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 208 Fed. 168 (S. D. N. Y. 1913),
aff'd, 216 Fed. 458 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914), cert. denied, 238 U. S. 632 (0914) (unmortgaged
corpus) ; Wood v. Guarantee Trust Co., 128 U. S. 416 (1888) (mortgaged corpus). For
a summary of the order in which the various funds must be exhausted, see Guaranty Trust
Co. of N. Y. v. Albia Coal Co., 36 F. (2d) 34, 36 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) ; FitzGibbon, supra
note 76, at 841, 842 n. 59.
82. See Wood v. Guarantee Trust Co., 128 U. S. 416"(18).
83. Bound v. South Carolina Ry., 50 Fed. 312 (C. C. D. S. C. 1892).
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practice in the federal courts has been to do so,84 and that custom was so firmly
entrenched that it is entitled to and will be treated as a recognized priority in
equity of unsecured claims over mortgages, thus giving the claimant a priority
by virtue of (b) (io).
Administration and Operating Expenses. The priority of administration
and operating expenses appears to be assured, and the rank in the order of
priorities of many such claims, especially those for operating expenses, has been
advanced to the disadvantage of lienholders.8 5 Subdivision (b) (3) compels the
inclusion in the reorganization plan of provisions for the payment in cash of
administrative costs and other allowances by the court, with the exception of
certain fees to parties,8 6 which may be paid in securities if such claimants ac-
quiesce. Subdivision (c) (3) also manifests an intent to authorize priority for
trustees' certificates, although the exact nature of that priority is rather obscurely
stated. 7 Of course, the problem still exists, as it did in equity, to determine what
are proper administrative expenditures.8 8 However, such an inquiry would be a
labor of supererogation here, as the equity rules are applicable under 77B. 89
The only problems of considerable novelty are those centering about rank,90
about (c) (9) providing for allowances to parties,91 and about (i) which author-
izes the judge to make such orders as he may deem equitable to protect the
obligations incurred in a prior receivership which is supplanted by a reorganiza-
tion proceeding.92 The payments mentioned in (i) probably will be treated as
administrative expenses under (b) (3) and (c) (3).
Interest. While the general rule seems to be that unsecured claims cease
to accumulate interest from the time the petition is filed, priority claims draw
interest, which receives the same preferred status as the principal of the claim.93
Summarizing briefly, it appears that under 77B priorities should be sub-
stantially fewer than they were in equity receiverships. Eliminated are three
well recognized groups of equity priorities:
(I) Federal claims which were prior by virtue of Rev. Stat. Section 3466,
but which were not liens under Section 3186; (2) State governmental claims
which, by state law, were preferred over unsecured creditors but not over
lienors, and which were themselves not liens; (3) Individual claims with the
same status, by local law, as the state claims above.
84. American Trust Co. v. Metropolitan S. S. Co., igo Fed. 113 (C. C. A. Ist, I9II),
cert. denied, 223 U. S. 727 (911) ; Continental & Corn. Tr. & Say. Bk. v. North Platte
Valley Irr. Co., 219 Fed. 438 (C. C. A. 8th, 915) ; Keelyn v. Carolina Mut. T. & T. Co., go
Fed. 29 (C. C. D. S. C. 1898).
85. See infra p. 823.
86. 77B (c) (9).
87. See (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 736, 738.
88. I CLAau, REcmvERs (2d ed. 1929) §§ 637-645, pp. 868-9o7; 16 FLErcHER, CORPORA-
TIONs (Perm. ed. 1933) §§ 7947-7949, 7954-7956; 3 GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
(1936) C. 25.
89. In re Avorn Dress Co., 78 F. (2d) 681, 79 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) (debtor
in possession as trustee may purchase goods in ordinary course of business and seller will be
entitled to priority, but one lending cash without a specific court order is not preferred) ;
It re James Shaw & Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 113516 (S. D. N. Y. 1935) ; Public Serv.
Comm. of Pa. v. Philadelphia R. T. Co., 82 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935), cert. denied
sub non., Citizens Pass. Ry. Co. of Phila. v. Public Serv. Comm. of Pa., 298 U. S. 673
(1936) ; In re Neustadtl Brewing Corp., 13 F. Supp. 832 (M. D. Pa. 1936) (reasonable
allowances for use and occupation).
90. See infra pp. 823 et seq.
gi. See In re Flamingo Hotel Co., 81 F. (2d) 749 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), and cases col-
lected in C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. ffff2331-2342; Medill, Fees and Expenses in a Corporate
Reorganization Under Section 77B (1936) 34 Mica. L. REV. 331.
92. In re United Cigar Stores Co. of America, 78 F. (2d) 691 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935);
In re Parker-Young Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 1 3399 (D. N. H. 1935).
93. Board of Comm'rs of Sweetwater Cty. v. Bernardin, 74 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. ioth,
1934), and cases collected therein, at 814-815.
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Retaining their priority are:
(i) Liens; (2) Federal tax and customs claims; (3) Unsecured claims of
the states which, by local law, have priority over liens in insolvency; (4) Indi-
vidual claims in a similar position; (5) "Six months" claims in public utility re-
organizations; (6) Administration and operating expenses during the reor-
ganization proceedings, including reasonable expenses incurred in prior receiver-
ships supplanted by the 77B reorganization. The bankruptcy priorities of
Section 64, as such, are inapplicable, but as the list of priorities illustrates, many
of the claims benefited by Section 64 are still preferred, as are liens which were
protected by Sections 67(d) and 70(a).
The Order of Priority Claims
Somewhat more uncertain than the determination of what claims are en-
titled to priority over unsecured creditors is the fashioning of a hierarchy among
these preferred claims when the assets of the insolvent corporation are insuffi-
cient to satisfy all of them. Although the equity courts were frequently met with
the problem, there has been little discussion of it in its entirety. Little light will
be shed by Section 77B with its unfortunate lack of explicitness on the point and
the total absence of anything like the helpful, even if not automatically deter-
minative provisions of Sections 64 14 and 67 (d) " of the Bankruptcy Act. Prop-
erly, therefore, in view of the ambiguity of 77B, the reorganization courts should
and probably will be guided by the equity precedents, 8 subject, of course, to the
modifications compelled by the altered purpose and scope of the Section.
Administration costs, in the more narrow sense, as distinguished from oper-
ating expenses, will undoubtedly receive the highest rank in the priority order.
The court will be certain to insure the payment of its costs, masters' and trustees'
fees, etc., and perhaps also the allowances permitted under (c) (9) to parties,
attorneys and others for "services rendered" and "necessary expenses incurred
in connection with the proceeding and the plan".9 These costs should precede
even mortgages, although the particular mortgagee neither institutes the pro-
ceedings nor benefits by them. This is a departure from equity principles which,
in the absence of institution of the proceedings by lienors or benefit to the
lienors as a result of the receivership, did not permit a divestiture of liens in
favor of administration expenses, except in the income realized during the ad-
ministration. 8 But the departure would seem justified by the fact that the 77B
court may reorganize all interests, whether secured or unsecured, so that the
proceedings are on behalf of all and affect all.
In equity receiverships, operating expenses, when duly authorized by the
court, were prior to unsecured creditors, since ostensibly the receivership was
conducted for their benefit. 9 But the displacement of liens by such expenses
was rare.100 Under 77B, the unsecured creditors should be in the same position
94. 30 STAT. 544, 563 (1898), amended, 44 STAT. 666 (1926), Ix U. S. C. A. § 1o4
(Supp. 1936).
95. 30 STAT. 544, 564 (898), amended, 36 STAT. 842 (9o), 11 U. S. C. A. § io7 (d)
(927).
96. See supra notes 12, 31.
97. Cf. In re Flamingo Hotel Co., 81 F. (2d) 749 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
98. See 16 FLWCHER, C0PORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1933) §§ 7947-7948.
99. Smith v. Shenandoah Valley Nat. Bk., 246 Fed. 379 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917) ; Byrnes
v. Missouri Nat. Bk. 7 F. (2d) 978 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) ; Cox v. Snow, 47 Idaho 229, 273
Pac. 933 (1929) ; Lewis and Jones & Laughlins Ltd. v. Linden Steel Co., 183 Pa. 248, 38
At. 6o6 (1897).
Ioo. Liens could be subordinated, in the case of private corporations, in only two situa-
tions: (I) when the lienholders "expressly or impliedly consented", which meant institution
of or intervention by them in the receivership [Kneeland v. American L. & T. Co., 136
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as previously, whereas the lienor should find himself divested of much of the
protection formerly thrown about him.
Section 77B expressly contemplates continued operation of the debtor cor-
poration for the purpose of rehabilitation,' 0 ' and reorganization of secured claims,
which no longer are inviolable. These provisions, coupled with that permitting
the issuance of trustees' certificates "for such lawful purposes . . . and with
. . . such priority . . . as may be lawful in the particular case" 102 appear
to extend the power of the court to prefer ordinary operating charges to out-
standing liens. And the Section was so construed in the recent case of In re
Prima Co.103 The operating expenses in that case were granted priority over
the claims of non-assenting bondholders when the operation of the plant was
felt necessary to preserve its "going value" and to adequately realize the value
of perishable stock, although there was other property more than sufficient to
satisfy the mortgages. In fact, the court relied heavily upon this surplus in
permitting the priority, pointing out that the mortgagees were thus not adversely
affected in a material way. One would think that the lien would also be sub-
ordinated when the value of the property was less than the lien claim and the
additional value accruing by the operation of the plant enhanced the likelihood
of complete satisfaction of the mortgage claim. If this be conceded, the
only situation which presents any difficulty is that in which the estate is ap-
proximately equal to the mortgage indebtedness, so that unwise expenditures
may render impossible complete payment. The Prima case does not govern
this last case, although from the language of the opinion it may be inferred that
the same result would be reached if the court thought the particular expenditure
judicious. The only solution is circumspection on the part of the court and
hesitancy to allow the priority unless a relatively clear showing is made that the
operation will be advantageous to the 77B estate. 0 4
Therefore, whether personally benefited or not, the secured creditor must
submit to subordination to claimants who contribute to the operation during the
reorganization proceedings, and preserve the interests of all those who had
shared in the enterprise, whether as secured or unsecured creditors, or as share-
holders. The only limitation is that the court should not risk a vain sacrifice of
the lienor's security.
U. S. 89 (i8go) ; Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734 (1876)], or actual consent [see Balti-
more B. & L. Ass'n v. Alderson, 9o Fed. 142, 147 (C. C. A. 4th, 1898)], the latter of course
not being displacement; (2) when the expense incurred was essential to the preservation of
the secured creditor's interest in the property, either by protecting physically the property
to which the lien attached [Montgomery Coal Corp. v. Allais, 223 Ky. 107, 3 S. W. (2d)
18o (3928) ; Porch v. Agnew, 67 N. J. Eq. 727, 57 At. 546 (19O4), 7o N. J. Eq. 328 (i9o5) ;
Lockport Felt Co. v. United Box Board & Paper Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 686, 70 Atl. 98o (igo8).
But cf. Raht v. Attrill, io6 N. Y. 423, 13 N. E. 282 (1887)], or by preventing the legal
destruction of the lienholder's interest, such as that which would attend a foreclosure by a
superior lienor [Lockport Felt Co. v. United Box Board & Paper Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 686, 70
Atl. 98o (i9o8) ; cf. Title Ins. & T. Co. v. California Development Co., 171 Cal. 227, 152 Pac.
542 (1935) ; McDermott v. Pentress Gas Co., 82 W. Va. 230, 95 S. E. 84, (918). See Note
(93) 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 788, and cases cited therein], or by a governmental body for
non-payment of taxes [Hanna v. State Trust Co., 70 Fed. 2 (C. C. A. 8th, 3895)]. Ex-
penses incurred for continued operation rather than preservation of the property could not
displace liens.
In the receivership of a public utility, operating expenses were permitted to displace
liens, the rule being based on much the same principles as those underlying the similar
priority accorded to six months pre-receivership claims. Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235
(3878) ; Union Trust Co. v. Illinois M. R. R., 137 U. S. 434 (1886) ; Meyer v. Johnston, 53
Ala. 237 (1875). But cf. Bound v. South Carolina Ry., 5o Fed. 312 (C. C. D. S. C. 3892).
3o. 77B (c) (2).
102. 77B (c) (3).
io3. C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 1 4451 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 736.
io4. See id. at p. 2397.
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Also prior to the mortgagee should come the unsecured claimant upon
whom state insolvency statutes confer priority to mortgages, for (b) (xo) com-
pels the retention of that rank. But like the mortgage, these claims are inferior
to the reorganization costs. "Six months" claimants, likewise, will precede the
mortgagee under (b) (io). And in view of the basis of the "six months" rule,'0 8
such claims should be prior to those preferred by state statutes, whenever they
do not merely duplicate each other. But again, the administration and operating
expenses are prior, in so far as corpus and receivership income are concerned.',
In pre-receivership income, however, the "six months" claimant may be preferred
even over these expenses, and such income may be traced into the corpus. 0 7
The priorities of the reorganization expenses inter sese are of no practical
importance, since all must be paid in order to secure approval of the plan.
Similarly the relative ranks of administrative charges and federal taxes which
accrued before the reorganization is of little moment since again both must be
paid. Taxes, whether state or federal, which accrue during the proceedings are,
as has been seen,108 properly treated as administration expenses and are entitled
to the same position in the priority order.
The position of federal taxes and customs claims in the scale of priorities is
one of uncertainty. Subdivision (e) (i) compels the disapproval of any plan
not providing for their payment, but it does not purport to rank these claims.
Therefore, if a mortgage is entitled to priority over the taxes, the plan should
not be approved unless both claims are provided for. In the event of the in-
ability to satisfy both fairly, the reorganization is not feasible, and liquidation
should be ordered. In determining what mortgages are prior, perhaps the
soundest solution would be to continue the lien order prevailing under Section
3186, for (e) (i) does not render it inapplicable. United States claims, there-
fore, would precede subsequently perfected liens, but would follow liens ante-
cedent in time. Each lien would have to be duly recorded or filed to retain its
position, so that tax liens which were not properly filed would be subordinate to
other liens,0 8 and would be prior only to unsecured creditors. As against the
latter, the taxes are still a lien, even though they are not filed.
When the unsecured creditor is one entitled to priority over mortgagees by
a state insolvency statute, the court is confronted by the same kind of dilemma
as that which first appeared in Ferris v. Chic-Mint Gum Co.,310 and which has
since become familiar by repeated discussion."' In the Ferris case, a mortgage
was first created; then a tax lien in favor of the Federal Government arose
under Section 3186; finally a local tax lien attached. By state law, the local lien
was preferred over the antecedent mortgage; by Section 3186, the federal lien
was prior to the later created local lien, but inferior to the mortgage. The
problem was to prefer the local lien to the mortgage, the mortgage to the federal
lien, and at the same time to have the federal lien precede the local lien. The
court apparently failed to realize the full implication of the situation, and with-
out any hesitation placed the local lien first, the mortgage second, and the federal
1o5. See supra note 77.
io6. The six months claimant is preferred only in the net receivership income. Union
Trust Co. v. Souther, 1O7 U. S. 59, (1882) ; Virginia & Ala. Coal Co. v. Central R. R., 170
U. S. 355 (1898).
Io7. Burnham v. Bowen, iii U. S. 776 (1884); Union Trust Co. v. Morrison, 125
U. S. S91 (1888).
io8. See supra pp. 88, 8ig.
iog. REv. STAT. § 3186 expressly so provides. 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 156o-1562 (1935).
In re MacKinnon Mfg. Co., 24 F. (2d) 156 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928).
110. 14 Del. Ch. 232, 124 Atl. 577 (1924).
iii. County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U. S. 8o, pi (1929) ; Blair, cited supra
note iS, at 28-3o; Rogge, cited supra note 24, at 275.
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claim last, saying that the United States wished to follow the mortgage, so that
the government must have wished to follow every claim prior to the mortgage.
This decision has been deservedly criticized, and the "accepted" solution is
that formulated in some detail by Paxton Blair.112 Stated briefly in the words
of the Supreme Court, ". . . the relative priorities could have been maintained
• . . by setting apart sufficient funds to pay the mortgage before paying the
federal taxes and then providing for payment of the state tax out of the sum so
set apart." 11 In the balance of the estate, the United States would come first,
but the mortgagee would follow the state in the fund set aside.
Rather ingenious, this plan purports to give effect to the conflicting state
and federal priority rules. Yet it appears faulty, especially when all the property
is mortgaged. Why not set aside a sum equal to the wage claim and from that
pay the United States, which is entitled to priority over wages by Section 3186?
The mortgagee, again, could not complain, as the state law subordinated him to
a claim of that amount anyway. It seems obvious that no answer exists to this
problem of how to reconcile the conflicting rules, for it must be admitted that if
there is property worth $i,ooo, and a mortgage, a wage claim, and a tax claim
each for $i,ooo, the wages alone will be paid. But that is directly in the teeth
of Section 3186, which requires the United States to be paid ahead of every
claimant except an antecedent mortgagee or other lienor.
Perhaps the soundest solution, although one whose simplicity is not likely
to appeal to the more legalistically minded, would be to pro rate the fund among
the three groups, following the payment of the administration expenses. This
at least has the merit of frank admission of defeat. Another might be based on
the supremacy clause of the Constitution,:" 4 recognizing the federal statute,
whether enacted under the bankruptcy power or the taxing power, as decisive.
The state rule would then be discarded because of the conflict, and the mortgagee
would be first, the United States second, and the wage claimant third. The chief
criticism would be the subjection of the relation between the mortgagee and the
wage claimant to the purely fortuitous existence of unpaid federal taxes. Sub-
division (b) (IO) is of no assistance. If it had read that unsecured claims which
were entitled to priority under state law should keep that rank, instead of "if a re-
ceiver in equity . . . had been appointed", the question would seem to be settled.
One federal statute, Section 3186, would then subordinate taxes to mortgages,
and another federal statute, 77B (b) (io), would place the wage claim before the
mortgage. Logic might then permit the solution arrived at by the Ferris case
without the benefit of a federal rule comparable to this. But as the law now
stands, no one can say what the relation was in equity among the three claims,
which relation is adopted by 77B, although the Supreme Court has viewed with-
out disapproval, 1 5 if not with approval, the solution offered by Blair.
To recapitulate, the order of the priority claims in a reorganization under
77B should be:
i. Administrative and operating expenses, including allowances for prior
receiverships and for the services and expenses incurred under (c) (9).
2. "Six months" claims in public utility reorganizations, which are prior
even over the administration costs in the pre-receivership income.
3. Unsecured claims entitled to priority over mortgages by state insolvency
laws, whether the debt is owed to the state itself or to an individual.
112. Blair, cited supra note 18, at 29-30.
113. County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U. S. 80, 91 (1929).
114. U. S. CoNsT. Art. VI, cl. 2.
HI5. County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U. S. 8o, 91 (1929).
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4. Mortgages and other liens in the order of their priority under the law of
the state in which the property has its physical situs.
5. Federal taxes and customs claims, accruing before the petition, which may
alter the ranking in three ways:
a. (4), then (5), then (3).
b. (3), (4), and (5) share ratably.
c. Set aside enough to pay (4); from that fund pay first (3), then (4),
then (5) ; from the balance of the estate after the fund is created, first pay (5),
then (3). This conflict will arise only in connection with liens which are prior
to the federal lien. The federal lien is prior to subsequently created liens under
Revised Statutes, Section 3186.
6. Unsecured creditors' claims other than those in (5).
7. Shareholders.
H.E.K.
Collateral Attack 1 Upon Decrees, Orders and Findings of a 77B Court
The scope and the magnitude of a corporate reorganization under Section
77B 2 of the Bankruptcy Act demand that the judgments, decrees and orders
of the 77B court be impervious to collateral attack by anyone. The typical 77B
reorganization involves hundreds of thousands of dollars, and yet some small
claimant, who undoubtedly had actual notice of the reorganization proceedings,
but who intentionally failed to participate therein in order to see whether it
would result advantageously to him, may attempt to upset the entire reorganiza-
tion because of some technical defect. Assuredly, some theory should, and will,
be evolved whereby 77B judgments, decrees and orders will be rendered con-
clusive.3
i. Collateral attack, as distinguished from a direct mode of assailing a judgment, is an
attempt in an independent proceeding to deprive the judgment of any adjudicative effect upon
the assailant. i FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 304. Thus a motion to set aside an
adjudication is not a collateral attack. In re Campbell County Hardware Co., 15 F. (2d) 78
(D. Tenn. 1924).
2. 48 STAT. 911 (1934), II U. S. C. A. §207 (a) (Supp. 1936).
3. The theory of the authors of this note is as follows :-Although the dogma is that
equity acts only in personam, it has been pointed out that the most outstanding illustration of
the inadequacy of this dogma is the federal equity receivership whose real purpose is the
ratable distribution of the corporate debtor's assets among creditors entitled to share. Dodd,
Equity Receiverships as Proceedings in Rein (1928) 23 ILL. L. REv. lO5.
Furthermore, while prior to the case of Gratiot County State Bank v. Johnson, 249 U.
S. 246 (I919), it was commonly said that the bankruptcy court acts in rem [see infra notes
6o and 71], the Gratiot case clarified this general statement to mean that the bankruptcy
court acts in rem only as to the status of the debor as bankrupt and in other respects does
not act in rem so as to bind everyone in a collateral proceeding. [E. g., in plenary suits by
the trustee wherein issues decided in the bankruptcy adjudication again must be proved.]
However, as will be indicated, this case can be restricted to the type of problem therein in-
volved. Therefore, it is submitted that, if Section 77B is based upon equity and bankruptcy
precedents, the jurisdiction of the 77B court is in rem, generally speaking, and its decrees,
orders and findings will be in most instances unimpeachable.
However, even though the jurisdiction of the 77B court be held real [according to an-
other accepted maxim of the courts and text-book writers], there must still be jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of the action, since if a court has no such jurisdiction, its pretended
judgment is null and void, not only upon direct attack but likewise in a collateral action. i
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §§ 325, 333, 337. The case of Thompson v. Whitman,
85 U. S. 457 (1873), held that a mere recital in the record of a court of the jurisdictional
facts upon which its jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action depended, is not deter-
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As is generally assumed by 77B lawyers, Section 77B is the embodiment of
most of the characteristics of federal equity receivership, 4 eliminating certain
imperfections.5 But since Section 77B is also a part of the Bankruptcy Act, it
is quite certain that the 77B court will rely upon either equity or bankruptcy
precedents in making a decree or finding. Therefore, if 77B proceedings are
to have a conclusive effect, the problem resolves itself into one of selecting those
aspects of equity and bankruptcy law which will have this desirable consequence.
I. Associations Subject to Section 77B
Any moneyed, business or commercial corporation, except a municipal,
insurance, railroad or banking corporation or a building and loan association,
may be reorganized under Section 77B. 6 Doubtless, on the basis of the bank-
ruptcy precedents, the 77B court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not
the association sub judice is amenable to 77B proceedings.
7
Where there is nothing on the face of the record showing that the associa-
tion is incapable of reorganization under Section 77B, the order of approval of
the petition can not be impeached in a collateral action." Thus, in Matin v. Auge-
mined proof of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But if a party has actually contested
and litigated the existence of the jurisdictional facts upon which such jurisdiction is based,
it would seem that the decision on this issue should prevent him and his privies from reliti-
gating the question collaterally on the ground that public policy requires that there be an
end to litigation. Gavit, Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter and Res Judicata (1932) 8o U.
OF PA. L. REv. 386; (1936) 46 YALE L. J. i59. And, since the nature of the 77B proceedings
apparently is in rem, there is sound argument that if some interested party has really dis-
puted and litigated the point, the finding of the court should be decisive upon everyone.
Moreover, it may be asserted even that if there has been an opportunity to litigate the juris-
dictional facts in the 77B court, there is no denial of due process in making the decision un-
questionable, because reorganization proceedings generally extend over a long period of time
and no interested person should be permitted to procrastinate in objecting to the jurisdiction
of the 77B court, with the intent of seeing whether the reorganization results to his benefit.
However, the approach of the courts to the problem under discussion is entirely different, as
the analysis of the cases discloses.
4. Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 56 Sup. Ct 412 (1936). See In re Grey-
ling Realty Corp., 74 F. (2d) 734, 736 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; Dodd, Reorganization Through
Bankruptcy: A Renedy for What. (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 1100, 1135; Friendly, Some
Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act (1934) 48 HARv. L. REv. 39; Sabel, The
Corporate Reorganizations Act (1934) i MINx. L. REv. 34.
5. For a discussion of the defects in the federal equity receivership, and the manner in
which they were attempted to be remedied by Section 77B, see i GEunEs, CORPORATE REOR-
GANIZATIONS (1936) 40-66.
6. 48 STAT. 911 (934), n U. S. C. A. §207 (a) (Supp. 1936). This provision is based
on Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act, 3o STAT. 547 (I898), as amended, 49 STAT. 246 (935),
ii U. S. C. A. § 22 (Supp. 1936). Although it may be contended that some corporations are
subject to involuntary proceedings which are not subject to voluntary proceedings, because
Section 77B (a) authorizes the initiation of involuntary proceedings against "any corpora-
tion" without adding the clause, "which could have become a bankrupt under Section 4 of
this Act", indubitably no such difference was intended. i GERDEs, CORPORATE REORGANIZA-
TIONS (I936) i62n. 2.
7. Denver First Nat. Bank v. Klug, 186 U. S. 202 (1902) ; Altonwood Park Co. v.
Gwynne, 16o Fed. 448 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o8) ; In re New England Breeders' Club, 169 Fed. 586
(C. C. A. ist, i9o9), cert. denied sub noin., Hub Construction Co. v. Hobbs, 215 U. S. 598
(19o9). In the exercise of such jurisdiction, the court decides a mixed question of law and
fact. Thus, if the court holds that a corporation may undergo bankruptcy proceedings, a
writ of mandamus does not lie on behalf of a creditor of the association to review the de-
cision. In re Riggs, 214 U. S. 9 (1909).
8. In re Columbia Real Estate Co., ioi Fed. 965 (D. Ind. 19oo), aff'd, 112 Fed. 643 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1902) ; In re Urban & Suburban Realty Title Co., 132 Fed. 14o (D. N. J. 19o4) ;
Edelstein v. United States, 149 Fed. 636 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o6), cert. denied, 205 U. S. 543
(1907) ; In re Broadway Savings Tr. Co., 152 Fed. 152 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o7) ; In re Fii'st
Nat. Bk. of Belle Fourche, 152 Fed. 64 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907) ; In re New York Tunnel Co.,
166 Fed. 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o8). Similarly, where the face of the record does not show
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dahl,9 there was a suit in a Minnesota District Court to sequester the assets of
a Minnesota corporation, begun by a judgment creditor of the corporation after
an execution on his judgment had been returned unsatisfied. A receiver was
duly appointed, and, because the available assets were insufficient to pay the re-
ceivership expenses and the corporate debts, by a petition in the suit he sought
an assessment on the shareholders of the corporation, under a clause in the Min-
nesota constitution providing for a shareholders' superadded liability in the case
of all corporations except manufacturing corporations. After public notice and
a hearing upon the petition, the Minnesota court rendered an order of assess-
ment, directing that the assessment be paid to the receiver. Augedahl, a share-
holder residing in North Dakota, refused to pay the assessment, and so the
receiver instituted suit in a North Dakota court to recover upon the order. The
defendant objected on the ground that the Minnesota court had been without
jurisdiction to make the order, the corporation being a manufacturing corpora-
tion, and therefore the order was not entitled to full faith and credit but could
be collaterally attacked. The North Dakota court sustained this contention, but
upon review by the United States Supreme Court, the judgment was reversed
by a six to three decision. The majority of the Court stated that the exception
of manufacturing corporations from the double liability provision of the state
constitution went "to the merits rather than to the jurisdiction". 10 The Court
expressly distinguished the case of Thompson v. Whitman,"1 conceding that the
latter case holds that a judgment may be collaterally attacked by showing an
absence of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but deciding that the Minnesota
court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
anything negativing the fact that the corporation is within the excluded classes of associa-
tions, the court will not suffer anyone to object to the order of adjudication, either by motion
to vacate or upon collateral attack, because in actual fact the association is a municipal, rail-
road, insurance or banking corporation or a building and loan association. United States v.
Freed, i79 Fed. 236 (S. D. N. Y. igio) (collateral attack) ; Dodge v. Kenwood Ice Co., 204
Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913) (motion to vacate). Likewise, if the petition avers that the
association is not in one of the excluded classes, but the averment is defective, the record
here too is unimpeachable. Itl re Marion Contract & Construction Co., I66 Fed. 6r8 (D.
Ky. i9og).
9. 247 U. S. i42 (i918).
1o. Id. at 147. "Charged with the duty, as the court was, of ascertaining whether there
was any liability to be enforced, it was its province to consider and decide every question which
was an element in that problem, including the one of whether the corporation was in the ex-
cepted class. That question required solution and in the power to solve it was lodged in the
court. The court did solve it, for . . . the order making the assessment is 'necessarily based
upon a determination that the corporation is of the class whose stock is assessable, and not
of the excepted class.' Whether the decision was right or wrong is not open to discussion
here. If wrong it was subject to correction on proper application to the court which made
it, or on appeal, but it was not void or open to collateral attack. . . . It re First National
Bank, 152 Fed. Rep. 64, 68-70." Id. at 149.
This view was not novel with the Supreme Court, but originated in the Belle Fourche
and Broadway Savings cases, which held that the petition in bankruptcy conferred upon the
court jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and whether the particular association was subject
to the Bankruptcy Act pertained only to the sufficiency of the cause of action; that is, if
the court decided that the corporation was capable of being adjudicated a bankrupt, it would
approve the petition, but otherwise it would dismiss it. In i GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZA-
TIONS (1936) 219, the view is expressed that this was overruled by the Vallelly case, 254
U. S. 348 (i92o). A different position is taken also in I REmINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (4th
ed. i934) 82, 83, on the ground that if the amenability of an association to bankruptcy per-
tained not to jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but simply to the sufficiency of the cause
of action, the defect could not be raised if there was waiver, consent, estoppel or laches;
but, it is pointed out, that certainly neither waiver nor consent would make the adjudication
of the association good by conferring jurisdiction, so that all the court meant was that if the
record omitted all allegations as to the nature of the association, the adjudication imported a
finding of the requisite jurisdictional facts and hence was unimpeachable.
IL i8 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1873).
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However, where it appears upon the face of the record, affirmatively and
not by mere omission, that the corporation belongs to one of the classes ex-
cluded from the Bankruptcy Act, the United States Supreme Court has held in
Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,:2 that the adjudication of bank-
ruptcy may be vacated by the debtor, even though it acquiesced in the adjudi-
cation (waiver), aided the trustee in the administration of the bankrupt estate
(estoppel), and made the motion to vacate about eight months after the adjudi-
cation (laches). But this decision should not furnish a precedent in a collateral
proceeding challenging the order of approval rendered by the 77B court. In
this and subsequent cases, the corporation involved was one affected with a pub-
lic interest, such as an insurance,13 banking,1 4 railroad,' 5 public utility,16 and mu-
nicipal 17 corporation,' 8 for all of which corporations there is special legislation
governing the administration of their property upon insolvency. 9 Because of
this fact, the Court in the Vallely case was apprehensive of the great disorder
that might result should the corporation be adjudicated bankrupt under the
Bankruptcy Act.20 The Court recognized the plausibility of the argument of
counsel 2' based, inter alia, upon the Belle Fourche and Broadway Savings cases,
but nevertheless sustained the motion to vacate, without even considering, let
alone overruling, the Matin case. It is quite probable that if the objection had
been raised upon a true collateral attack, notwithstanding the appearance of the
defect upon the face of the record, the Court might have repelled the attack on
the ground that undermining the adjudication would effectuate much greater
disorder.
22
A quite different problem is presented where the court's jurisdiction over
the subject-matter is conceded. Thus, in Krey Packing Co. v. Wildwood Springs
Resort Ass'n,2 3 one group of creditors filed an involuntary petition against an
association, alleging that it was a common law trust. Thereafter, another group
of creditors filed an involuntary petition against the same association in the same
court, averring that it was a co-partnership. The former petition was first
approved, and then members of the bankrupt association moved to dismiss the
second petition. In granting the motion, the court declared that since the ques-
12. 254 U. S. 348 (1920).
13. Ibid.
14. Woolsey v. Security Trust Co., 74 F. (2d) 334 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
15. See In re New York Tunnel Co., 166 Fed. 284, 285 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o8).
16. In re Hudson River Electric Co., 167 Fed. 986 (N. D. N. Y. 19o9).
17. See Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U. S. 348, 356 (1920).
18. But see In re Elmsford Country Club, 50 F. (2d) 238 (S. D. N. Y. 193), where a
New York membership club (golf) was involved, and a motion to vacate was allowed.
ig. See Columbia Ry. Gas & Elec. Co. v. South Carolina, 27 F. (2d) 52 (C. C. A. 4th,
1928).
20. "It is not necessary to point out the disorder that would hence result and the diffi-
culties that the officers of a bankruptcy court would encounter in such situation. . . . For
a court to extend the act (Bankruptcy) to corporations of either kind is to enact a law, not
to execute one." Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U. S. 348 (1920), at 356.
21. Id. at 353.
22. Such was the decision in Earnhardt v. Brown, 197 N. C. 204, 148 S. E. 25 (1929).
In that case, subscribers to stock in a bankrupt building and loan association and borrowers
therefrom brought suit to restrain foreclosure of their deed of trust and to cancel the indebt-
edness secured thereby, after deducting the payments made on their shares from the amount
borrowed. The trustee in bankruptcy resisted the plaintiffs' claim. It appeared that the
record in the bankruptcy proceeding revealed that the bankrupt was a building and loan
association. Relying upon the Vallely case, the plaintiffs contested the capacity of the trus-
tee in bankruptcy to be a party to the suit. But without discussion the North Carolina
Supreme Court said that the Vallely case was distinguishable, and affirmed a judgment
authorizing a foreclosure of the deed of trust, relying solely on Denver First Nat. Bank v.
Klug, 186 U. S. 202 (1902).
23. 4 F. (2d) 793 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
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tion whether the association was a common law trust was an issue in the first
proceeding and was necessarily so determined by the adjudication, that finding
was res judicata in the second proceeding.
II. Initiation of Involuntary Proceedings Under Section 77B
Section 77B provides that three or more creditors who have provable claims
aggregating $i,ooo or over may file a petition against the debtor corporation.
2 4
A. Number of Creditors: Whether or not the number of creditors re-
quired to file a petition in involuntary bankruptcy is a jurisdictional fact that
can be disproved upon collateral attack has never been decided by the United
States Supreme Court.25 However, several federal lower court cases have
arisen involving direct attacks, such as motion to dismiss, demurrer, motion to
grant a discharge, or motion to vacate, and the decisions are about equally di-
vided. Some hold that the number of creditors is a requirement pertinent to the
court's jurisdiction over the subject-matter. 26  On the other hand, it has been
said 27 that "neither the fact of the existence of (three) creditors . . . nor the
averment of that fact is indispensable to the jurisdiction of the court" over the
subject-matter, 28 but is requisite only to constitute a good cause of action and to
invoke a favorable adjudication. Since no cases have been decided relative to
collateral attack, and since those concerning direct attack are almost evenly
divided, it is submitted that in the event of a collateral attack upon a decree,
order or finding of a, 77B court because of a defect in the number of petition-
ing creditors, the court entertaining the collateral action may well follow the
line of cases which hold that the number of creditors requirement is not juris-
dictional.
B. Validity of Petitioning Creditors' Claims: In connection with the re-
quirement of 77B that creditors must have provable claims in order to file an
involuntary petition,29 two problems arise: First, whether the adjudication can
be collaterally attacked on the ground that the petitioning creditors did not have
provable claims; and second, whether the finding that the creditors did have such
claims is res judicata in subsequent proceedings.
As to the first question, it has been held by the United States Supreme
Court that the adjudication is not subject to collateral attack, on the theory that
the defect in the nature of the claim does not pertain to jurisdiction over the
subject-matter °0
24. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), II U. S. C. A. §207 (a) (Supp. 1936).
25. Text-book writers have taken opposing views. In i GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZA-
TIONS (1936) 274, the view is expressed that the requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be
vaived. On the other hand, it is said in BLACK, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1926) § 276, that the
weight of authority is that the requirement is not jurisdictional.
26. In re Scammon, Fed. Cas. No. 12,427 (N. D. Ill. 1874) ; In re Gillette, 2O4 Fed. 769
(W. D. N. Y. 0goo) ; Cutler v. Nu-Gold Ring Co., 264 Fed. 836 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920) ; Navi-
son Shoe Co. v. Lane Shoe Co., 36 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. ist, 1929). "If the petition for
adjudication were made by only two creditors, the law requiring three, would be a juris-
dictional defect on the face of the record, making any adjudication void." See the New
York Tunnel case, 166 Fed. 284, 285 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o8).
27. Ex parte Jewett, Fed. Cas. No. 7303 (D. Mass. 1875) ; In re Duncan, Fed. Cas. No.
4131 (S. D. N. Y. 1876) ; In re Henderson, 9 Fed. 196 (S. D. Ohio, 188i) ; In re Haff, 136
Fed. 78 (C. C. A. 2d, I905).
28. It re Plymouth Cordage Co., 135 Fed. iooo, OO3 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905).
29. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), II U. S. C. A. § 207 (a) (Supp. 1936).
3o. Chapman v. Brewer, 114 U. S. 158 (1885). This was a suit by an assignee in bank-
ruptcy against a person claiming an adverse interest in the bankrupt's property. In holding
the adjudication unimpeachable, the Court said: "It is also objected by the defendant that
the record does not show that the petitioner filed any proof of his claim. . . . The
adjudication states that, on consideration of the proofs, it was found that the facts set forth
in the petition were true. It was not necessary to show in this case what the proofs were.
If the District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, and the bankrupt voluntarily
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But there is a division of authority on the question whether the adjudica-
tion is res judicata of the validity of the claim in plenary suits, or on appeal
from subsequent disallowance by the referee of the petitioning creditor's claim.
In the case of In re UhIfelder Clothing Co.,31 it was held that the adjudication
was conclusive; 32 but in In re Continental Engine Co.,33 the court permitted the
referee to disallow a claim of one of the petitioning creditors. The difference
in opinion rests on a determination of who are recognized as "parties" to the
bankruptcy proceedings. The court in Ayres v. Cove,34 declared that all cred-
itors are represented by the bankrupt, but the Continental case recognized as
parties only creditors who appeared. For this reason, the latter case argued
that the trustee in bankruptcy is not precluded from contesting the claim on be-
half of non-intervening creditors.3 5 It seems that this view is compelled by the
decision in the Gratiot case, for, since creditors are under no obligation to inter-
vene, they are not bound by the findings.
In an equity receivership proceeding, it is necessary that a creditor have a
judgment with a return of nulla bona before he may have a receiver appointed
for his debtor.36 Since this requisite is similar to the requirement of the prov-
ability of the petitioning creditors' claims in bankruptcy proceedings, it would
seem that 77B courts may be influenced by the equity decisions. As to individ-
ual debtors, although no case could be found allowing collateral attack on the
appointment of a receiver on the ground that the creditor was a simple contract
creditor, the proceedings have been dismissed on this ground; 17 and In re Rich-
ardson's Estate 3 1 indicates that collateral attack might be permitted in a suit by
the trustee in bankruptcy to recover property from a state receiver who was
appointed at the instance of a simple contract creditor, for in that case the court
justified the receiver's appointment on the ground that one of the petitioning
creditors was a lien creditor, which conferred jurisdiction upon the court, and
although it made an unwarranted extension of the receivership to all of the
debtor's property, this was only an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction not open
to collateral attack. As to corporate debtors, consent by the corporation will
render the appointment of the receiver impregnable upon collateral attack, even
though it be made.upon petition of a simple contract creditor,3 9 the theory being
that corporations constitute a well recognized head of equity jurisdiction and
that it is not necessary to the court's jurisdiction over the subject-matter that
the creditor be a lien creditor. 40
Thus by equity receivership precedents, the 77B court's approval of the
petition for reorganization is unimpeachable by reason of a defect in the prov-
ability of the petitioning creditors' claims. But in view of the decision in the
appeared, and the adjudication was correct in form, it is conclusive of the fact decreed, and
can be impeached only by a direct proceeding...." Id. at I68-i69.
31. 98 Fed. 409 (D. Cal. I899).
32. But it was also held that the adjudication was not conclusive of the validity of notes
brought in collaterally to prove insolvency.
33. 234 Fed. 58 (C. C. A. 7th, I916).
34. 138 Fed. 778 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o).
35. The court relied on the dissent by J. Sanborn in Ayres v. Cove.
36. Maxwell v. McDaniels, 184 Fed. 311 (C. C. A. 4th, igio) (appeal).
37. Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U. S. 77 (1923).
38. 294 Fed. 349 (D. Tex. 1923).
39. American Can Co. v. Erie Preserving Co., I7I Fed. 540 (W. D. N. Y. 1909).
4o. Brown v. Lake Super. Iron Co., I34 U. S. 530 (1889). The language of the Court
indicates a strong tendency to allow no collateral attack if possible: "After months had
passed, much business had been transacted and large responsibilities assumed, the corpora-
tion, for the benefit of a few creditors and to destroy the equality between all, comes in with
the technical objection that the creditors initiating the proceedings should have taken one
step more at law before coming into equity." Id. at 535.
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Gratiot case, it is not unlikely that the approval of the petition by the 77B court
will not be res judicata in plenary suits. This, however, will not have a dis-
turbing effect, because the entire reorganization will not be undermined.
C. Amount of Claim: Under bankruptcy law, if the petition is regular on
its face, then the amount of the claim is not a fact which can be shown on col-
lateral attack.41  Thus, as was said obiter in the New York Tunnel 42 case,
"if the aggregate amount of claims were stated to be $5oo, as required by
law, and because of set-offs or other reasons was in point of fact less, an adjudi-
cation would be an error to be corrected by appeal," and would not be void.
But where the defect in the amount of the claim is apparent upon the surface
of the record, no case could be found involving a collateral attack, but there is
a division of authority in the direct attack cases. Some hold that the amount-of-
claim requirement is not a jurisdictional fact; 43 others adhere to the view that
this requisite is pertinent to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter
of the action."
According to the decisions in ordinary federal cases, the amount claimed
in the petition in good faith and not colorably is the test. Where the facts, as
they appear on the record, do not create a legal certainty of the insufficiency of
the amount in controversy, the court has no right to dismiss the suit.4 ' But if
it affirmatively appears on the face of the record that the requisite amount does
not exist, then there is a defect in the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-
matter, which is always open for consideration, and which can not be cured by
the consent of the parties.
48
Therefore, when a problem arises as to the amount of the claim in a 77B
proceeding, if the bankruptcy and ordinary federal precedents are followed, there
is no difficulty where the record is fair on its face. But if it is apparent on the
record, then there is a choice between the ordinary federal cases and some of
the bankruptcy decisions. Since there was no case concerning a collateral attack
for an apparent defect, it would seem that sound principle dictates that the
amount of the claim is not a jurisdictional fact for purposes of collateral attack
upon 77B proceedings.
III. Proper District for Initiating 77B Proceedings
Section 77B provides that the petition, whether voluntary or involuntary,
shall be filed with the court in whose territorial jurisdiction the corporation, dur-
ing the preceding six months or the greater portion thereof, has had its prin-
cipal place of business or its principal assets, or in any territorial jurisdiction
41. Michaels v. Post, 21 Wall. 398 (U. S. 1874) ; 46 YALE L. J. 159, 16o (1936).
42. 166 Fed. 284, at 285 (C. C. A. 2d, igo8).
43. In re Duncan, Fed. Cas. No. 4131 (S. D. N. Y. 1876) ; It re Funkenstein, Fed. Cas.
No. 5z58 (D. Cal. 1876) ; In re Henderson, 9 Fed. 196 (S. D. Ohio 1881) (In a note to this
case, decisions are cited both ways).
44. Taft Co. v. Century Savings Bank, 14I Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o5) ; Doty v.
Mason, 244 Fed. 587 (S. D. Fla. 1917); see Finn v. Carolina Portland Cement Co., 232
Fed. 815, 818 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916). A discharge can not be collaterally attacked for failure
to itemize claims in the petition. Barrett v. Carney, 33 Cal. 530 (1867). Where the Bank-
ruptcy Act required petitioning creditors to have claims aggregating $5oo and the form re-
quired by the United States Supreme Court for a creditors' petition required the nature and
amount of each claim to be stated with particularity, the failure to do so was held not an
error which can furnish the basis for a collateral attack. Bail v. Hartman, 9 Ariz. 32I, 83
Pac. 358 (905).
45. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550 (1886); Witmore v. Rymer, 169 U. S. 115
(1898) ; Reed, etc. Inc. v. Miller, 2 F. (2d) 280 (E. D. Pa. 924).
46. Hegler v. Faulkner, 127 U. S. 482 (1888); Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U. S. 68
(igoo); Edwards v. Bates County, 55 Fed. 436 (W. D. Mo. 1893); Robinson v. W. Va.
Loan Co., 9o Fed. 770 (D. W. Va. 1898); Royal Ins. Co. v. Stoddard, 201 Fed. 915 (C. C.
A. 8th, 192) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 23 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928).
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in the state in which it was incorporated.4 7  This section should be construed in
the light of Fairbanks Steam Shovel Co. v. Wills,4" in which the United States
Supreme Court, under a similar provision of the Bankruptcy Act proper, held
that the question of the trustee's capacity to sue, which was challenged on the
ground that the corporation did not have its principal place of business in the
district, was capable of being "waived". Since jurisdiction over the subject-
matter can not be waived or conferred by consent of the parties, according to
the dogma, this decision clearly indicates that the propriety of the district for
filing a petition does not relate to jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but must
pertain to venue 49 only, concerning which collateral attack is not permissible.
However, the lower federal courts have apparently overlooked the Fairbanks
case not only in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings, ° but also in proceedings under
77B. Thus, in Hamilton Gas Co. v. Watters,51 an involuntary petition for re-
organization under 77B was filed in the District Court for the Southern District
of West Virginia, alleging that the corporation had its principal place of busi-
ness therein. Then the debtor filed a voluntary petition in the District Court
for the Southern District of New York, averring that its principal place of busi-
ness was located in that district. The latter petition was first approved. The
debtor then answered the former petition, declaring that the West Virginia court
was without jurisdiction. But the West Virginia court approved the petition
and denied the debtor's motion to dismiss. Upon appeal, the West Virginia
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree, saying:
"If it should be found that the principal place of business of the debtor
during the six months preceding the filing of the petition was not in the
Southern District of New York, then the New York Court had no juris-
diction to pass upon the petition, and the court below should retain juris-
diction . . . If, however, the principal place of business of the debtor was
in the Southern District of New York, the court below should vacate its
order approving the creditors' petition filed therein . . ." -'
47. 48 STAT. 912 (I934), II U. S. C. A. §207 (a) (Supp. 1936). It is said in i GERDEs,
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONs (1936) 224, that the requirement pertains to the court's juris-
diction over the subject-matter, and if not satisfied, the court has no power to proceed, and
jurisdiction can not be conferred by waiver or consent.
48. 240 U. S. 642 (1916). In this case, a creditors' petition in bankruptcy was filed in
the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, and the corporate debtor was ad-
judicated bankrupt. Then, the bankrupt filed a petition with the bankruptcy court to re-
strain a chattel mortgagee of the bankrupt ,from selling the mortgaged property. The
mortgagee appeared and answered without questioning the jurisdiction of the court. There-
after, a trustee was appointed and substituted as a party to the controversy in place of the
bankrupt. Then the mortgagee for the first time objected to the appointment of the trustee
and his capacity to sue, on the ground that the corporation's principal place of business was
in the Northern District of Illinois, but the Court rejected this contention because by
answering and making the defense on the merits the defendants had effected a "waiver".
49. Similarly, if the proceedings are brought in the wrong division of the proper dis-
trict which contains more than one division, the courts say that this raises a problem of
venue only, and not of jurisdiction, and collateral attack is not permitted. Clark-Herrin-
Campbell Co. v. Claflin Co., 218 Fed. 429 (C. C. A. 5th, 1914); In re Carter-Williams
Grain & Coal Co., 297 Fed. 441 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924) ; In re Lewis, 32 F. (2d) 287 (D. Miss.
1929). Cf. In re Miller's Dresses, Inc., I F. Supp. 378 (D. Tex. 1932).
5o. Thus, see Central Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F. (2d) 721, 730
(C. C. A. 8th, 1932) ; Finn v. Carolina Portland Cement Co., 232 Fed. 81s (C. C. A. 5th,
1916). But it was not overlooked in Roszell Bros. v. Continental Coal Corp., 235 Fed. 343
(E. D. Ky. 1916), aff'd sub. non., In re Continental Coal Corp., 238 Fed. 113 (C. C. A. 6th,
1916) (a collateral attack case relying on the Fairbanks case).
51. 75 F. (2d) I76 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
52. Id. at 182. The same result was reached upon identical facts in another 77B case,
In re Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., Io F. Supp. 419 (S. D. N. Y. 1935), decided in reliance
solely upon the Hamilton Gas decision.
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Inasmuch as the Fairbanks case undoubtedly decided that the propriety of
the district in which to file a petition does not savor of jurisdiction over subject-
matter, and a defect therein can not be collaterally attacked, it seems that the
above two 77B decisions are clearly erroneous, and are also unsound in policy,
since the result fosters competition among the reorganization courts with con-
sequent friction and disorder in the administration of debtors' estates. 53
IV. Insolvency of the Debtor
When a voluntary petition in bankruptcy has been filed, the question of
insolvency is not in issue,. 4 and therefore an adjudication on such a petition will
not be res judicata on the bankrupt as to the question of insolvency either at
the time of the filing of the petition or any time prior thereto.5 5 Quite obvi-
ously, too, the adjudication can not be attacked collaterally on this ground.
However, in the case of an involuntary petition, the Bankruptcy Act makes
proof of insolvency at the date of the petition a condition precedent to an adjudi-
cation.56 This being so, the adjudication cannot be collaterally impeached by
any who were "parties or privies" to the bankruptcy proceeding, since the adjudi-
cation of insolvency is conclusive upon them.5 7  Whether non-intervening cred-
itors could upset a bankruptcy proceeding after adjudication on the ground that
the debtor was solvent has apparently not yet been decided; dicta, however,
indicate that they could not. Thus it has frequently been reiterated, and appar-
ently never expressly denied, that the adjudication of the status of the bankrupt
is in rem, and is therefore binding on the world,58 so that notice alone of the
proceeding should be sufficient to avoid the possibility of collateral attack on
the adjudication.
As to whether the adjudication is res judicata of insolvency in a later plen-
ary suit against a non-intervening creditor, the United States Supreme Court
held, in Gratiot County State Bank v. Johnson,59 that such creditors are not
53. As for the "six months or the greater portion thereof" requirement, this can not be
raised in a collateral attack by a creditor upon the adjudication, if the bankrupt filed the
petition without fraudulent intent. In re Tully, 156 Fed. 634 (E. D. N. Y. 9o7) ; Barrett
v. Carney, 33 Cal. 430 (1867).
54. See discussion in It, re Pryatt, 257 Fed. 362, 363 (D. Nev. 1918).
55. In re Ann Arbor Machine Co., 278 Fed. 749 (D. Mich. 1922); People's Nat. Bank
v. Foltz, 25 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928). Cf. Abbott v. Wauchula Mfg. Co., 24o Fed.
938 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917), where the court held that the admission by the bankrupt of in-
solvency made the adjudication on an involuntary petition collaterally unimpeachable; the
theory apparently being that the court has determined the question of insolvency, and not
that the admission amounts to a voluntary petition, for in such case the decision of the
question of insolvency would not be res judicata. But see In re Gibney Tire & Rubber Co.,
241 Fed. 879 (D. Pa. 1917), where the court said that the petition could not be vacated on
the ground of insolvency, the admission of the bankrupt having the effect of eliminating the
question of insolvency as an issue.
56. 30 STAT. 546 §3 (b) (1898), 1I U. S. C. A. §21 (b) (1927).
57. It re Malkan, 261 Fed. 894 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919). See Simpson v. Western Hard-
ware Co., 97 Wash. 626, 167 Pac. 113 (1917).
58. See Abbott v. Wauchula Mfg. Co., 24o Fed. 938 (C. C. A. 5th, I917) ; also cases
cited infra note 71.
59. 249 U. S. 246 (1Q19). This case overruled a line of lower court decisions to the
effect that persons whose acts predicated the bankruptcy were "parties" and bound by the
adjudication of insolvency at the date of the transfer. Bear v. Chase, 99 Fed. 920) (C. C.
A. 4th, 19oo); It re American Brewing Co., 112 Fed. 752 (C. C. A. 7th, 19o2); Cook v.
Robinson, 194 Fed. 785 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912) ; Lazarus v. Eagen, 206 Fed. 518 (D. Pa. 1912) ;
Breckons v. Snyder, 211 Pa. 176 (i9o5). Following the Gratiot case: Sanitary Mfg. Co. v.
Momsen Co., 51 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931); Charlesworth v. Hipsh, Inc., 84 F. (2d)
834 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936). The theory of the Gratiot decision is that while creditors have a
right to intervene, they are under no duty to do so. A case decided in the same year as the
Gratiot case seemingly misconstrues that decision, holding that the question of insolvency is
res judicata and cannot be relitigated in the plenary suit, but that whether there has been
an unlawful preference is not conclusively decided because of the additional element that the
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"parties" and are not precluded from disputing the question, on the theory
that while the creditors have a right to intervene in the bankruptcy proceedings,
they are under no duty to do so. However, the Court expressly distinguished
between the problem as to the adjudication of the status of the debtor, and the
problem as to the effect of the finding of insolvency in subsequent suits against
alleged fraudulent transferees, recognizing that the former was in rem. 60 Thus,
in that case, the trustee's capacity to sue was not denied by the Court, but it was
held that the finding that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer
was not conclusive on the transferee, although that was the act of bankruptcy
on which the adjudication was predicated.
In equity receivership cases, the court's determination of the insolvency 61
of a business for which a receiver has been appointed has been held conclusive
on collateral attack.6 2 Furthermore, the finding of insolvency is also res judicata
in later proceedings, as under Section 77B, since the parties and the issues are
substantially identical. 6
Since Section 77B makes the existence of insolvency (whether in the equity
or the bankruptcy sense) a jurisdictional fact with respect to both creditors' 64
and debtors' petitions, 5 courts entertaining suits attacking 77B proceedings will
be confronted with the same problems that have arisen in bankruptcy and equity
receivership situations. This much is quite certain: Neither the equity nor the
bankruptcy precedents will permit the reorganization proceedings to be entirely
undermined because of the debtor's solvency. However, it is doubtful whether
the Gratiot case can be nullified by permitting the finding of insolvency to be
res judicata as against non-ifitervening creditors; for, just as in ordinary bank-
ruptcy proceedings, it is a "hardship" to require creditors to appear in the reor-
ganization proceeding or be forever concluded by the findings, and "hardship"
was the basic reason given in the Gratiot case.6 6 Nor will the cases which held
the equity receivership determination of insolvency to be res judicata in later
77B proceedings permit an opposite result in the Gratiot type of situation, for
those cases hold merely that in later proceedings respecting the status of the
debtor the finding shall be res judicata, and not that the finding shall be final in
determining the property rights of a transferee.
V. Acts of Bankruptcy
Section 77B, as well as the strict Bankruptcy Act, requires that an act of
bankruptcy shall have been committed within four months of the filing of an
guilty knowledge and fraudulent conduct of the grantee must be shown. Ward v. Central
Trust Co., 261 Fed. 344 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919).
6o. "The adjudication is, for the purpose of administering the debtor's property, that is,
in its legislative effect, conclusive upon all the world . . . So far as it declares the status
of the debtor, even strangers to the decree may not attack it collaterally." Gratiot County
State Bank v. Johnson, 249 U. S. 246, at 248 (1919).
61. I. e., inability to meet current debts as they mature.
62. Welch v. Capital Co., 76 Ind. App. 416, 132 N. E. 313 (1921).
63. It re Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 12 F. Supp. 528 (W. D. N. Y. 1935).
64. "Three or more creditors . . . may file a petition stating that such corporation is
insolvent or unable to meet its debts as they mature . . ." 48 STAT. 912 (1934), II U. S.
C. A. 207 (a) (Supp. 1936).
65. "Any corporation . . . may file . . . a petition stating the requisite jurisdictional
facts . . . and that the corporation is insolvent or unable to meet its debts as they mature."
48 STAT. 91i (934), 11 U. S. C. A. 207 (a) (Supp. 1936).
66. The Court said: ". . . to require every creditor to acquaint himself with the issues
raised in every proceeding in bankruptcy against his debtors, in order to determine whether
a decision on any such issue might conceivably affect his interests; and, if so, either to par-
ticipate in the litigation, or, at his peril, suffer the decision of every question therein
litigated to become res judicata as against him, would be an intolerable hardship upon cred-
itors." 249 U. S. 246, at 250.
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involuntary petition.6r In connection with this provision, two problems arise,
just as in the case of insolvency and the validity of petitioning creditors' claims:
First, whether the approval of the petition is open to collateral attack; and
second, whether the adjudication or approval is res judicata against transferees
upon the question whether there was the commission of an act of bankruptcy.
As to the first problem, the adjudication can not be impeached collaterally
on the ground that there was no act of bankruptcy; 6s nor even on the ground
that the act of bankruptcy alleged and proved had been previously determined
not to be an act of bankruptcy.69 Similarly, this is no basis for questioning the
trustee's capacity to sue.70 The theory apparently is that the defect does not
relate to jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Thus, it would seem that these
decisions are persuasive of the distinction suggested concerning insolvency, and
it is likely that a similar result will be reached in the latter situation, for there
is no substantial difference between the nature of the act of bankruptcy pre-
requisite and that of the prerequisite of insolvency; if one does not pertain to
the subject-matter, neither should the other.
However, with reference to the second problem, the adjudication is not,
in a plenary suit against the transferee, res judicata of the particular act of
bankruptcy on which the adjudication is based.71  The reasoning is that he is
not a "party" to the bankruptcy proceeding, and further that the right of the
transferee to retain the security was not litigated in the bankruptcy proceeding.
But if the transferee appears in the proceeding, he is bound by the adjudication; 72
probably, however, this finality would be limited to questions litigated in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding, and would therefore not include the creditor's intent to de-
fraud, since that is not essential to an act of bankruptcy. 73 However, if the
petition alleges several acts of bankruptcy, and there is a general adjudication,
the adjudication is not res judicata as to the commission of any of the acts of
bankruptcy,74 or any element, even as to participating creditors. Possibly, if
there was a common element in the acts of bankruptcy averred, e. g., a transfer
of property within four months, the court would hold that element to have been
conclusively decided.
67. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), II U. S. C. A. 207 (a) (Supp. 1936).
68. It re Hecox, 164 Fed. 823 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o8).
69. Larkin-Green v. Sabin, 222 Fed. 814 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915). The lower court stated
an additional reason, namely, that defendant was estopped by reason of participation by
proving his claim; perhaps this affected the Circuit Court of Appeals decision. 218 Fed.
984 (D. Ore. 1914). Cf. cases cited supra note 63, holding that proof of claim will not
work an estoppel respecting collateral attack because of improper district.
70. Michaels v. Post, 21 Wall. 398 (U. S. 1874) ; Ward v. Central Trust Co., 261 Fed.
344 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919) ; Silvey & Co. v. Tift, 123 Ga. 8o4, 51 S. E. 748 (195o).
71. "Its adjudication of bankruptcy is a judgment in rem fixing the status of the bank-
rupt, which, upon that point, is binding on the world, and can only be impeached for fraud
in obtaining it . . . Although the adjudication of bankruptcy is a judgment in rein and as
such conclusive on all the world, and although in arriving at that judgment, the bankrupt
court declares the conveyance alleged as the act of bankruptcy to be a preference among
creditors, . . . such declaration is no part of the judgment, but is merely incidental to it.
: No one not a party to the record is affected by it, except so far as it is in rem."
Lewis v. Sloan, 68 N. C. 557, 561, 562 (1873). "The adjudication in bankruptcy, therefore,
conclusively determined the status of Griffin as a bankrupt, but did not conclude the defend-
ants from making their defense on a suit by the trustee in bankruptcy against them to recover
the property." Silvey & Co. v. Tift, 123 Ga. 8o4, 814, 51 S. E. 748, 753 (1905). "As a
judgment in rein it conclusively fixed the status of Screws as a bankrupt, but Everett . . .
had still a right to be heard on the validity of the transfer." Traders' Ins. Co. v. Mann, 118
Ga. 381, 382, 45 S. E. 426 (19o3).
72. Magnus v. Ketcham, 112 Fed. 752 (C. C. A. 7th, 19o2). See Silvey & Co. v. Tift,
123 Ga. 804, 813, 51 S. E. 748, 752 (I905).
73. See Ward v. Central Trust Co., 261 Fed. 344 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919).
74. It re Letson, 157 Fed. 78 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907) ; In re Julius Bros., 217 Fed. 3 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1914); Carter v. Whisler, 275 Fed. 743 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921); Silvey & Co. v. Tift,
123 Ga. 804, 51 S. E. 748 (19o).
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Since no act of bankruptcy is necessary in a voluntary petition, the question
has been presented whether a debtor's answer admitting insolvency and acquies-
cing in the adjudication will make the proceeding a voluntary one, eliminating
the necessity of an act of bankruptcy. The courts have apparently adopted the
view that it does not have this effect.75  The result is of little import, since there
could be no collateral attack on the adjudication even upon an involuntary peti-
tion.
The equity receivership has no requirement analogous to that of an act of
bankruptcy, so the sole reliance will have to be upon bankruptcy precedents in
deciding collateral attacks upon 77B decrees, orders and findings. The result
then should be the same as that suggested in regard to insolvency: The adjudi-
cation will not be impeachable, but non-intervening creditors will not be bound
in plenary suits as to the commission of the act. The recent 77B decisions bear
out this suggestion. Thus, although a prior foreclosure receivership is not an"equity receivership" under Section 77B,7 6 the court has held, in both In re 211
East Del. Place Bldg. Corp.77 and In re Blackwood Ass'n Hotels, Inc.,78 that the
approval of the petition in 77B is not open to collateral attack, since a sufficient
act of bankruptcy is not essential to jurisdiction over the subject-matter; the
court had power to decide and although it decided erroneously, the sole remedy
is by appeal.
VI. Good Faith
Section 77B provides that the 77B court shall approve the petition for reor-
ganization, whether voluntary or involuntary, only if satisfied that it has been
filed in good faith.7 9  The nature of this good faith requirement is not within
the scope of this article,80 but, aside from signifying honesty of purpose on the
part of the petitioner,"' it means that if a bankruptcy or equity or foreclosure
proceeding has been going on for some time in another court, the 77B court
may refuse to entertain the petition for reorganization and thereby interfere with
the pending proceeding.8 2 In other words, there may be a lack of good faith if
the wisdom or feasibility of reorganization is dubious.8 s
75. In re Condon, 209 Fed. 800 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913) ; It re Elmsford Country Club, 50
F. (2d) 238 (S. D. N. Y. 193).
76. Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 56 Sup. Ct. 412 (1936).
77. 14 F. Supp. 96 (D. Ill. 1936).
78. C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 114o23 (D. Ill. 1936).
79. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), II U. S. C. A. §207 (a) (Supp. 1936).
8o. On what is "good faith", see Gerdes, "Good Faith" in the Initiation of Proceedings
Under Sectiont 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (935) 23 GEO. L. J. 418; Note (1934) 48 HARv.
L. REV. 287.
81. The general rule in the bankruptcy cases is that the reasons or motives which in-
spired the filing of the petition, whether voluntary or involuntary, are immaterial; thus it
makes no difference whether it is filed vexatiously or maliciously, for a sinister, selfish and
ulterior purpose. In re Fowler, Fed. Cas. No. 4,998 (D. Mass. 1867) ; Bank of Elberton
v. Swift, 268 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 5th, 1920); In re Automatic Typewriter & Service Co.,27, Fed. i (C. C. A. 2d, ig2); Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Tarlton, 294 Fed. 698 (D.
Tenn. 1923); In re Pickering Lumber Co., i F. Supp. 82 (D. Mo. 1932); In re Van
Bokkelen, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1934); In re National Motorship Corp., 7 F. Supp.
Ioo1 (S. D. N. Y. 1934). Contra: In re United Grocery Co., 239 Fed. ioi6 (D. Fla. 1917);In re Weidenfeld, 257 Fed. 872 (E. D. N. Y. 1919). For a special exception, see Zeitinger
v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 244 Fed. 719 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917) ; In re Denton
Stores Co., 5 F. Supp. 3o7 (S. D. Ohio 1933) (vacation of adjudication permitted if pro-
cured by corporate directors to hinder action already, or about to be, begun against them,for mismanagement). But the motive of the petitioner for a consent receivership may be
investigated. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504 (934).
82. Note (1934) 48 HARv. L. REV. 283, 289. See In re Prairie Ave. Bldg. Corp., ii F.
Supp. 125 (E. D. Ill. 1935).
83. Manati Sugar Co. v. Mock, 75 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; In re Tennessee
Pub. Co., 81 F. (2d) 463 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936), cert. granted, Tennessee Pub. Co. v. Amer-
ican Nat. Bank, 56 Sup. Ct. 943 (1936).
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If the 77B court should be satisfied that the good faith requirement has
been fulfilled, will a collateral attack for lack of good faith be permitted? This
question was squarely raised and decided in Albert Pick & Co. v. Webster Hall
Corp.14 In that case a 77B petition was filed by the debtor in the District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan, without notice to any interested party, and
was approved by the court. A date for the hearing upon the matter of the
appointment of a trustee was fixed, and at that time, the receiver of the Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, at the request of certain
creditors but not by order or with the knowledge of the court, appeared and
asked for the transfer of the proceedings to his court, on the ground that all the
property of the debtor was in the Western District of Pennsylvania and had
been under his receivership for about four years. Nevertheless, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan appointed a trustee who demanded
that the receiver turn over to him all the property in his hands. The receiver
immediately asked the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
for instructions, and he was ordered to comply with the demand of the trustee.
The court said:
"The court for the Eastern District of Michigan had jurisdiction to
entertain the reorganization petition and pass upon its form and good faith,
and to appoint a permanent trustee, and thus assume control over the estate
of the defendant in the instant action. Some of the circumstances attend-
ing its assumption of control may be regrettable, but the jurisdiction is
plain . . .
This decision is the only one extant upon the point under discussion and
appears eminently correct. Good faith is an intangible, discretionary thing which
the 77B court is under a duty to find affirmatively before proceeding further,
and if the court does proceed further, no one should be able in a collateral pro-
ceeding to impugn the lack of good faith.
VII. Fairness and Equity of the Plan of Reorganization
Section 77B (f) provides that "After hearing such objections as may be
made to the plan, the judge shall confirm the plan if satisfied that (I) it is
fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of
creditors or stockholders .,, 85
Before the passage of this clause of Section 77B, the case of Northern Pac.
Ry. v. Boyd, 6 decided by the United States Supreme Court, was considered the
guiding light by which to test the fairness of a plan of corporate reorganization.
In that case, probably the most prominent in the law of corporate reorganiza-
tions, the plan of reorganization of the Old Company in the equity receivership
did not provide for the unsecured creditors, although the plan did permit par-
ticipation by stockholders and secured creditors. In a previous action by some
unsecured creditors of the Old Company, in which it had been alleged that the
plan was the outcome of a conspiracy between the secured creditors and the
stockholders to exclude the unsecured creditors, the court had decided that the
84. C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 1 3269 (W. D. Pa. 1935). Accord: In re Cheney Bros., 12
F. Supp. 6o9 (D. Conn. 1935) (motion to vacate).
85. 48 STAT. 911 (934), II U. S. C. A. §207 (f) (Supp. 1936).
86. 228 U. S. 482 (1913). For discussions of this case, see Dodd, cited supra note 4, at
iioo; Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization
(1933) 1g VA. L. REV. 540; Friendly, cited supra note 4, at 74;Developnzetts in. the Law-
Reorganization Under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1936) 49 HARv. L. Rlv. Iiii,
190; 2 GERDEs, CORPORATE REORGANIzATIONs (1936) 1725 et seq. It would seem that the
Boyd case was incorrectly decided from the collateral attack aspect because the Court had
jurisdiction and only its exercise of jurisdiction was erroneous.
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Old Company had no equity in the property. Boyd, an unsecured creditor, then
brought suit against the New Company, averring that the sale in the receivership
proceedings to the defendant was invalid as to his unsecured claim because made
pursuant to an illegal plan of reorganization, and praying that the property
transferred to the New Company be subjected to the payment of his claim. It
appeared that the suit by Boyd was brought about ten years after the plan of
reorganization had been effected; and that the plaintiff had not only notice by
publication, but also actual knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings and
yet took no steps to assert his rights. The Supreme Court decided that the sale
to the New Company was "fraudulent" with respect to the unsecured creditors
and affirmed a decree subjecting the property transferred to the defendant to
the satisfaction of Boyd's claim.
In other words, according to the Boyd case, if a plan of reorganization pro-
vides for participation by stockholders, without according to creditors their pri-
ority rights over stockholders, the plan is first of all fraudulent in law, and sec-
ondly, creditors who have been imposed upon may in a collateral proceeding
against the reorganized corporation secure satisfaction of their claims out of the
reorganized property. This principle was not original with the Boyd case, but
had been propounded in earlier Supreme Court cases.87 Yet, when reiterated
by the Court, the decision aroused the antagonism of the reorganization bar
against it, and till this day the principle has been exceedingly unpopular because
of its undue favoritism to minorities.88 Nevertheless, when clause (f) of 77B
was enacted, it was generally assumed that it was intended to embody the prin-
ciple of the Boyd case, 9 so much so that one writer said that the nullification or
modification of the principle would involve the taking of the property of cred-
itors without due process of law. 0
However, a sounder interpretation of 77B (f) was rendered in the recent
case of Downtown Inv. Ass'n v. Boston Metropolitan Bldgs., Inc.,91 where the
court declared that Section 77B (f) did not incorporate into itself the "fixed
principle" of the Boyd case as to what constitutes a fair and equitable plan of
reorganization. But because of the belief that one of the chief reasons for the
enactment of 77B was to preclude unreasonable minorities from obstructing
fair and equitable plans of reorganization and thereby to facilitate corporate re-
organizations,92 the court said:
"We agree with counsel . . . that a plan under 77B is in substance
nothing more than a composition between the creditors and the debtor and
that it is merely an extension of section 12 of the original Bankruptcy Act
with such additions and provisions as are necessary to adapt it to the com-
plicated conditions that may arise in corporate reorganizations.9 3
"Reorganization plans under 77B may differ from offers in composi-
tion in form and complexity, but the difference is little more than one of
degree. A plan of reorganization when accepted is nothing more than an
87. Railroad Co. v. Howard, 7 Wall. 392 (U. S. 1869) ; Louisville Trust Co. v. Louis-
ville, N. A. & C. Ry., 174 U. S. 674 (1899).
88. See Dodd, cited supra note 4, at 11oi, n. 2.
89. Id. at 1132; Developments in the Law, cited supra note 86, at i9o; 2 GERDFs, COR-
PORATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936) 1737.
go. Dodd, cited supra note 4, at 1132.
91. 81 F. (2d) 314 (C. C. A. Ist, 1936). The court said: "This raises a question of
whether a plan under 77B to be fair and equitable must measure up to the rulings of the
Supreme Court in equity receiverships as announced in the case of Northern Pacific Rail-
way Co. v. Boyd . . . This is an important question upon which we find no direct authority
or precedent." Id. at 322.
92. Id. at 323.
93. Id. at 318.
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agreement between the debtor and its creditors and stockholders, or if the
debtor has been declared insolvent, then between the several classes of
creditors." 94
Although this opinion has been severely criticized on the ground that it does
not bear out a proper statutory construction of 77B (f),95 nevertheless there is
no doubt that it is welcome to the reorganization bar as a whole. The fact that
the Boyd case was decided by a five to four vote indicates the weakness of the
Boyd principle, and the Downtown case supplies the means whereby to circum-
vent the non-democratic consequences of the Boyd principle.
The Downtown case involved an appeal from an order confirming a plan of
reorganization and not a collateral attack, but it would seem that if, as stated
in the Downtown case, the principles of composition under Section 12 of the
Bankruptcy Act 9 6 are applicable to 77B (f), creditors whose rights have not
been adequately provided for in the plan of reorganization would be powerless
to make a successful collateral attack upon it.9 7 In ordinary bankruptcy proceed-
ings, it has been held by the United States Supreme Court in Hanover Nat. Bank
v. Moyses 9s that a discharge in bankruptcy discharges all debts if there has been
notice by publication to creditors, personal service being unnecessary because the
discharge is in rem and not in personam. Composition agreements, though in a
sense superseding the bankruptcy proceedings, are regarded as part of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings,99 and when confirmed, have the effect of a discharge. 00
Apparently, therefore, mere notice by publication is constitutionally adequate to
bar any objections by a creditor who fails to enter the composition, even though
his claim be omitted from the agreement. 01'
It is true that compositions concern only unsecured creditors and that 77B
reorganizations are inherently more complicated because of the numerous differ-
ent classes of creditors involved, but essentially the problem is identical in both
cases. Although 77B courts have permitted direct attacks upon orders confirm-
ing plans of reorganization because creditors have not been provided for suffi-
ciently,10 2 apparently no case has yet arisen wherein a collateral attack upon the
confirmation has been attempted. Should such a case arise, however, the court
94. Id. at 323.
95. DePvelopnentts in the Law, cited supra note 86, at 1191.
96. 30 STAT. 549 (I898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 30 (1927).
97. Assuredly 77B proceedings are very similar to composition agreements. Composi-
tion agreements are effected by the consent of a majority of the unsecured creditors, result-
ing in a settlement of the claims at a stipulated percentage. A cash deposit sufficient to pay
off priority claims and costs must be made. In re Fisher & Co., 135 Fed. 223 (D. N. J.
i9o5) ; In re Harvey, 144 Fed. goi (E. D. Pa. 19o6). But creditors may waive the deposit
of cash in payment of their percentages. Kinkead v. Bacon & Sons, 23o Fed. 362 (C. C. A.
6th, 1916). This deposit, whether cash or notes, is distributed among the creditors and the
debtor is given a discharge. Matter of Englander's, Inc., 267 Fed. 1012 (E. D. Pa. 192o).
98. 186 U. S. 181 (19Ol). "Congress may prescribe any regulations concerning dis-
charge in bankruptcy that are not so grossly unreasonable as to be incompatible with
fundamental law, and we can not find anything in this act on *that subject which would
justify us in overthrowing its action . . . If such notice to those who may be interested in
opposing discharge, as the nature of the proceedings admits, is provided to be given, that is
sufficient." Id. at 192. Of course, if no notice is given, the debt is not discharged. 42 STAT.
354 (1922), 11 U. S. C. A. §35 (1927).
99. See In re Bickmore Shoe Co., 263 Fed. 926, 928 (N. D. Ga. 192o).
100. 36 STAT. 839 §6(c) (i910), ii U. S. C. A. §32 (C) (1927); In re Ullman, i8o
Fed. 944 (S. D. N. Y. 19io).
IOI. A state court will not permit collateral attack upon the composition. Loeffler v.
Wright, 13 Cal. App. 224, lO9 Pac. 269 (i9io). Thus, even if notice is mailed to a wrong
address, the creditor may not have the composition set aside. In re Rudnick, 93 Fed. 787
(D. Mass. 1899) ; In re Siff, 295 Fed. 761 (S. D. N. Y. 1923) ; see Lindh v. Booth Fisheries
Corp., 8o F. (2d) 733 (C. C. A. 9th, I935).
1O2. In re Parker-Young Co., 15 F. Supp. 965 (D. N. H. 1936).
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will very probably follow the bankruptcy principles of composition. If the doc-
trine of the Boyd case is adopted, corporate reorganizations under Section 77B
will be greatly impeded because that doctrine permits creditors to withhold par-
ticipation in order to determine whether the plan will result beneficially to them.
In this connection, there should be noted the case of In re 620 Church
Street Bldg. Corp.,-03 recently decided by the United States Supreme Court,
which seems to impose a very important limitation upon the Boyd case. In that
case, there was a proceeding under 77B, resulting in the confirmation of a plan
of reorganization. The unsecured creditors prayed an appeal from the confirma-
tion to the Circuit Court of Appeals upon the ground that the plan was unfair
and inequitable and deprived them of their property without due process of law,
and insisting that their consent to the plan was necessary. It appeared that there
was no equity in the property above the secured indebtedness, and that in addi-
tion to the unsecured creditors the stockholders had not been allowed to partici-
pate in the plan. The Circuit Court of Appeals refused to review the confirma-
tion, and, upon certiorari from the Supreme Court, it was held that the Circuit
Court had not abused its discretion in declining to review because the unsecured
creditors had not shown any injury, there being no equity in the property above
the secured indebtedness and the reorganization court having appraised the unse-
cured creditors' claims as having "no value". In other words, if upon direct
attack a creditor may not be allowed to attack the plan as being unfair and in-
equitable because he shows no injury, a fortiori a collateral attack will not be
permitted when he can prove no injury. In the Boyd case, as the dissenting
opinion pointed out," 4 the plaintiff had not been injured, and yet the Court per-
mitted him to object to the fairness and equity of the plan upon collateral attack.
Consequently, the Church Street case appears to restrict the decision in the Boyd
case.
Conclusion
An analysis of the cases reveals, first of all, that there is a prime necessity
for a redefinition of terms. What constitutes a "collateral attack"? Thus, is
a motion to vacate a collateral attack? What is meant by "jurisdiction"? Do
certain facts pertain to jurisdiction more so than other facts? 105 Should the
regularity of the record be important? If so, why is a judgment of a federal
district court immune from collateral attack, notwithstanding that the face of
the record reveals a lack of diversity of citizenship? 100 In the second place,
courts should keep in mind a distinction between jurisdiction and the exercise of
jurisdiction. There may be jurisdiction, but the exercise thereof may be erro-
neous. Thirdly, in connection with the last-mentioned point, courts should
attempt to reconcile the conflicting principles of due process and finality of judg-
ments. 01 Finally, courts should confer greater finality upon orders of the 77B
court where an attempt is being made to upset an entire scheme than where a
mere incident of the reorganization is being contradicted without any threat of
undermining the reorganization and undoing work which may have necessitated
many years and exhausted considerable funds to accomplish.
M. S. DuB.
H. G.
103. 299 U. S. 24 (936).
104. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, at 511 (1913).
1O5. See Farrier, Full Faith and Credit of Adjudication of Jurisdictional Facts (1935)
2 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 552.
IO6. Des Moines Navigation & R. R. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U. S. 552, 557 (887).
A fortiori, where the lack of diversity of citizenship is not apparent on the face of the
record. McCormick v. Sullivant, IO Wheat. 192 (U. S. 1825); Dowell v. Applegate, 152
U. S. 327 (1894).
1o7. See Gavit, Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter and Res Judicata (1932) 80 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 386.
